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ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes two essays in nonlinear labor income taxation with tax-driven mi-
grations. In the first essay, we study optimal nonlinear income taxation in an open economy with
migration possibilities and social comparisons. Recent evidence suggests that globalization has not
just reduced the barriers to international labor mobility but also induced more cross-country com-
parisons. In an open economy with tax-driven migrations and consumption externalities motivated
by altruism or jealousy, we derive an optimal tax formula that subsumes existing ones obtained
under maximin social objective and additively separable utility, and identify the sign of second-
best marginal tax rates for all skill levels. We establish thresholds of the elasticity and level of
migration to determine when relativity and inequality are complementary (or substitutive) in shap-
ing the optimal top tax rates. These thresholds are in general different between altruism-type and
jealousy-type relativity. Surprisingly, there exist reasonable combinations of relativity, mobility
and inequality such that tax competition results in higher equilibrium top tax rates than proposed
in autarky. Also, under both Nash and Stackelberg tax competition, we have the following numer-
ical finding by plugging realistic parameter values in our tax formula. If the migration probability
of top-income workers is around 50%, then the country facing labor inflow (respectively, outflow)
of these types of workers implements around 10% lower (respectively, higher) top tax rates than
suggested by the autarky equilibrium which does not allow for migration possibilities.
In the second essay, we study majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax
schedules proposed by a continuum of workers who can migrate between two competing juris-
dictions at the expense of some migration cost. Both skill and migration cost are the private
information of each worker. Assuming quasilinear-in-consumption preferences, the tax schedule
proposed by the median skill type is the Condorcet winner that redistributes incomes from the rich
and poor toward the middle. While it features negative marginal tax rates for low skills, it fea-
tures positive marginal tax rates for high skills who have elasticities of migration smaller than a
threshold. In a comparison with the autarky economy, we establish the skill-dependent threshold
ii
of migration elasticity for all types of workers. If their migration elasticities are higher than their
respective threshold, then migrations induce lower marginal tax rates than does autarky; otherwise
migrations induce higher marginal tax rates for the jurisdiction facing net labor inflow in low skills
while net labor outflow in high skills. Counterfactual simulations using empirical parameter esti-
mates show that eliminating migrations in the U.S. would generate top tax rates over 20% higher
than the 42.5% that was actually implemented.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation studies redistributive labor income taxation with tax-driven migrations. We
consider a continuum of workers who differ in both migration costs and labor productivities that
are assumed to be their private information. We hence follow the mechanism design approach
and aim to design redistributive-taxation policies satisfying the participation constraint, incentive-
compatibility constraints and the balanced government budget constraint.
In the first essay1, we study redistributive taxation policies in an open economy with taking
into account both migrations and cross-country social comparisons. This study is motivated by
recent evidence that globalization has not just reduced the barriers to international labor mobility
but also induced more cross-country social comparisons. For example, [3], [4] and [5] estimate
large migration elasticities with respect to income tax rate for highly skilled workers. The mobility
of taxpayers thus induces tax competition between countries. Using survey-data for countries in
Western Europe, Becchetti et al. [6] find that the contribution of cross-country comparisons to
well-being increased from the early 1970s to 2002. In fact, since Veblen [7], economists (see,
[8], [9], [10], [11], [12] and [13]) recognize that the well-being of economic agents depends on
relative consumption in addition to absolute consumption, no matter they are motivated by altruism
or jealousy. So, taxing consumption externalities seems to be welfare enhancing as any other
Pigouvian tax. We focus on the tool of labor income tax and design optimal nonlinear tax schedules
to deal with income inequality and consumption externality, including positive externality driven
by altruism and negative externality driven by jealousy. By setting up a framework taking into
account both consumption relativity and labor mobility, we are allowed to design more realistic
income tax schedules. In addition, we can analyze how relativity and mobility affect optimal
income tax rates under any given degree of inequality. In particular, for top-income workers, we
ask how income inequality and consumption relativity together determine their tax rates, and how
the resulting joint effect changes across different types and magnitudes of cross-country labor
1This chapter is based on my unpublished working paper [2].
1
flows. To our knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to address these interesting issues
in a unified framework.
In the second essay, we follow the political-economic approach and study majority voting over
selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of workers (see, [14])
who can migrate between two competing jurisdictions at the expense of some migration cost. To
analyze how the possibility of geographic mobility affects the design of redistributive taxation, the
literature (see, e.g., [15], [16], [17], [18], [1]) that builds on the seminal work of Mirrlees [19]
focuses on the normative perspective. Little attention has been paid to the positive perspective.
We hence address this question: how would the schedule of redistributive taxation look like when
workers can vote both in the ballot box and with their feet? In particular, answering this question
allows us to reexamine the conventional wisdom (see [20]) claiming that geographic mobility limits
the ability of government to redistribute incomes via a tax-transfer system. To our knowledge,
the answer is not yet well established. Indeed, the literature either assumes away asymmetric
information (e.g., [21], [22]), restricts attention to flat tax (e.g., [22]) and special connections
between skills and migration costs in a two-type setting that rules out countervailing incentives
(e.g., [23]), or focuses on probabilistic voting in a representative democracy (e.g., [24]). These
simplifications make it possible to obtain sharp predictions, whereas reasonable doubts about the
generality and robustness of their predictions may arise.
To achieve our goal, we consider an economy consisting of two jurisdictions. Following [25],
[26], [27] and [14], we are interested in selfishly optimal income tax schedules. Each worker can
be viewed as a citizen candidate who can propose an income tax schedule that maximizes the
utility of her own type. Then, the pairwise majority rule is used to select the tax schedule that
is going to be implemented in equilibrium. By assuming quasilinear-in-consumption preferences,
we show that the tax schedule proposed by the median skill type is a Condorcet winner in the
majority-rule equilibrium, which provides support for the empirical finding of [28]. In addition,
the equilibrium tax schedule exhibits the following characteristics. First, it coincides with the
maximax tax schedule for types below the median skill level and coincides with the maximin tax
2
schedule for types above the median skill level. Second, marginal tax rates are negative for low
incomes, whereas for higher incomes there is an endogenously determined and skill-dependent
threshold of the elasticity of migration such that they are negative only when migration elasticity
is higher than this threshold, otherwise they are nonnegative. Third, it creates three potential
discontinuities, one at the skill level of the proposer and the other two at the endpoints of skill
distribution, in the resulting income schedule. And fourth, by allowing for inter-jurisdictional
migrations that endogenize the ex post skill distribution and median skill level, the resulting level
of distortion and redistribution deviates from that in an autarky economy without allowing for
migration possibilities. Counterfactual simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that
eliminating migrations in the U.S. would generate top tax rates over 20% higher than the 42.5%
(e.g., [29]) that was actually implemented.
3
2. RELATIVITY, MOBILITY, AND OPTIMAL NONLINEAR INCOME TAXATION IN AN
OPEN ECONOMY
2.1 Introduction
Recent evidence suggests that globalization has not just reduced the barriers to international
labor mobility but also induced more cross-country social comparisons.1 For example, [3], [4]
and [5] estimate large migration elasticities with respect to tax rate for highly skilled workers.
The mobility of taxpayers thus induces tax competition between countries.2 Using survey-data
for countries in Western Europe, Becchetti et al. [6] find that the contribution of cross-country
comparisons to well-being increased from the early 1970s to 2002. In fact, since Veblen [7],
economists3 recognize that the well-being of economic agents depends on relative consumption in
addition to absolute consumption, no matter they are motivated by altruism or jealousy. So, taxing
consumption externalities seems to be welfare enhancing as any other Pigouvian tax.
In the optimal income taxation literature, economists either focus on how consumption relativ-
ity and income inequality together shape the optimal tax schedules under a single government (e.g.,
[31], [8], [32]) or focus on how labor mobility and income inequality together shape the optimal
tax schedules with two competing governments (e.g., [17], [1], [33]). Even though these studies
have provided some insightful predictions, the first strand of literature neglects cross-border effects
and assumes away the possibility that people may have endogenous outside options and hence their
reservation utilities may be endogenously determined in the optimal tax design problem, while the
second strand uses the optimality of income tax schedules that is biased and hence misleading for
policy suggestions as people do exhibit altruism- and jealousy-type preferences in reality.4
In this paper we focus on the tool of labor income tax and design optimal nonlinear tax sched-
ules to deal with income inequality and consumption externality, including positive externality
1Piketty [30] even argues that cross-country social comparisons seem to constitute an important part of the moti-
vation behind Thatcher’s and Reagan’s drastic income tax reductions in the early 1980s.
2A recent example is the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act" signed into law by President Trump.
3See, [9], [10], [11], [12] and [13].
4See, e.g., [34], [35], and [36] for evidences.
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driven by altruism and negative externality driven by jealousy, in an open economy with interna-
tional labor mobility. By setting up a framework taking into account both consumption relativity
and labor mobility, we are allowed to design more realistic income tax schedules. In addition, we
can analyze how relativity and mobility affect optimal income tax rates under any given degree of
inequality. In particular, for top-income workers, we ask how income inequality and consumption
relativity together determine their tax rates, and how the resulting joint effect changes across dif-
ferent types and magnitudes of cross-country labor flows. To our knowledge, our paper represents
the first attempt to address these interesting issues in a unified framework.
For this purpose, we focus on income tax schedules that competing governments find optimal
to implement in two types of non-cooperative equilibrium: Nash and Stackelberg. We start with
the Nash solution in which each country takes the strategy of the opponent country as given. Each
government fully internalizes consumption externalities affecting workers within its own country,
but ignores the externalities affecting the opponent country.
As argued by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman [37], Nash competition is not necessarily the
most realistic one since the ability to commit to pubic policy may differ among countries. We thus
analyze a Stackelberg equilibrium where one country acts as the leader with the opponent country
acting as the follower. As is canonical, the leader shall recognize the behavioral responses of the
follower and take into account the externalities it causes to the follower. This, accordingly, implies
that optimal tax schedules in these two types of equilibrium are in general different for the leader
country.
In each country, workers differ in both skills and migration costs, the continuous distributions
of which are common knowledge while the values of which are assumed to be their private informa-
tion. We thus follow the mechanism design approach. Taking as given income taxes implemented
in both countries, workers make individual decisions along two margins: the allocation of one-unit
time between work and leisure on the intensive margin, and the location choice on the extensive
margin. To make the analysis more transparent, we restrict attention to the most redistributive
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social objective, maximin5, in the spirit of Rawls [39]. As a result, after taking into account in-
dividual responses, each government designs incentive-compatible allocations such that the utility
of the worst-off is maximized and the public-sector budget constraint is satisfied. In particular,
provided the endogenous location choice, workers actually have an endogenous reservation utility
that depends on the tax policy of the opponent country. Throughout, taxes can only be conditioned
on income and are levied according to the residence principle.
We characterize the best response of each government and obtain a formula determining opti-
mal marginal tax rates. The optimal tax formula obtained by Oswald [40] and Kanbur and Tuomala
[8] (K&T hereafter) for a closed economy is augmented by a migration effect that changes the
Pigouvian-tax term and Mirrleesian-tax term, leading to a much more comprehensive formula. In
addition, as in [1], we derive an optimal tax formula under the useful benchmark called the Tiebout-
best, in which workers’ skills are assumed to be common knowledge while migration costs remain
private information. By eliminating incentive-compatibility constraints, the maximization problem
of tax design becomes much simpler. In fact, we explicitly solve for Tiebout-best tax liabilities and
Tiebout-best marginal tax rates.
Under jealousy-type relativity, the tax schedule has these characteristics. First, if second-best
tax liabilities are no higher than Tiebout-best tax liabilities, then second-best marginal tax rates in
both Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium are positive over the entire income range but the endpoints.
Second, we identify a group of (sufficient) conditions such that second-best tax liabilities are lower
than Tiebout-best tax liabilities for almost all skills. Third, for workers of the lowest skill, second-
best marginal tax rate is positive and also is higher than that under the Tiebout-best, implying a
downward distortion relative to the Tiebout best. Fourth, for workers of the highest skill, marginal
tax rate is the same under the second-best and the Tiebout-best, which may be interpreted as a ver-
sion of “no distortion at the top". And fifth, for the leader country under Stackelberg competition,
marginal tax rates are always higher than those under Nash competition, which however cannot be
directly carried over to the case with altruism-type relativity.
5As is demonstrated by [38], focusing on the maximin objective significantly simplifies the analytical analysis of
the optimal income tax structure.
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Under altruism-type relativity, the tax schedule has these characteristics. First, for workers
of the lowest skill, second-best marginal tax rate is higher than Tiebout-best tax rate, implying a
downward distortion relative to the Tiebout best. Second, for workers of the highest skill, marginal
tax rate is the same under the second-best and the Tiebout-best, and is strictly negative if the ex
ante skill distribution is bounded above. And third, we identify a group of conditions such that:
(a) the Mirrleesian-tax term in the tax formula is positive over the entire income range but the
endpoints; (b) for workers of the highest skill, second-best tax liability is lower than Tiebout-best
tax liability, with the difference representing their information rent; and (c) for workers of the
lowest skill, second-best tax liability is positive with a lower bound.
To analyze how relativity and inequality together shape the marginal tax rate imposed on top-
income workers, we obtain a closed-form formula of the optimal asymptotic marginal tax rate.
We show that the elasticity and level of migration are two key variables in determining whether
or not relativity and inequality play a complementary role in shaping the optimal top tax rate.
More importantly, we have identified relevant thresholds of these two variables under both types
of consumption relativity, enabling us to make sharp predictions regarding the composite effect of
relativity and inequality placed on equilibrium top tax rates.
By using realistic parameter values from empirical studies, we simulate these tax rates in both
types of equilibrium and compare them to those under the K&T-formula. In both Nash and Stack-
elberg equilibrium, the country with large labor inflow imposes much lower while the country
with large labor outflow imposes much higher tax rates than suggested by K&T. Also, there are
reasonable combinations of parameters measuring relativity, inequality and mobility such that tax
competition induces higher tax rates than in autarky. This finding yields an important departure
from the common prediction regarding the competition effect on equilibrium tax rate. As an impli-
cation for open economies, these results reveal that normative public policy recommendations on
redistributive income taxes must take between-country tax competition, tax-driven migrations and
relative consumption concerns seriously, otherwise workers are likely to face welfare losses or the
economy is likely to face efficiency losses.
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Our study is related to the literature studying optimal nonlinear income taxation in an open
economy, such as [15], [16], [41], [1], [37] and [42]. The major difference between these studies
and our paper is that we focus on examining how the interplay of relativity and inequality deter-
mines the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule and meanwhile how the joint effect of relativity
and inequality is modified by tax-driven migrations, which are ignored by these studies. They,
except [37], completely ignore the effect of relative consumption concern placed on the design of
Mirrlees income taxes. As numerically illustrated in Section 2.5, relative consumption concern
does result in quantitatively significant effects on the optimal marginal tax rates and hence should
not be ignored. Though [37] consider both tax competition and relative consumption concerns,
cross-border labor mobility is not allowed there, whereas we show that migrations can shape the
tax-competition effect and hence equilibrium tax rates in an important way. As such, our study
shows the importance of simultaneously taking into account tax-driven migrations and relative
consumption concerns in designing optimal nonlinear income taxes and hence extends the litera-
ture towards a more realistic tax design.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the model. Section 2.3
derives the optimal tax formula in Nash equilibrium and establishes some qualitative properties.
Section 2.4 derives the optimal tax formula in Stackelberg equilibrium and establishes some quali-
tative properties. Section 2.5 provides some numerical examples regarding the optimal asymptotic
marginal tax rates and compares our results with those calculated using K&T-formula. Section 2.6
concludes. All formal proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
2.2 The Model
We consider an economy consisting of two countries, indexed by i ∈ {A,B}. The measure
of workers in country i is normalized to 1, while that of the opponent country −i is denoted by
n−i, for 0 < n−i ≤ 1. Each worker is characterized by three characteristics: her native country
i ∈ {A,B}, her skill w ∈ [w,w] with 0 < w < w ≤ ∞, and the migration cost m ∈ R+ she
supports if she decides to live abroad. If a worker faces an infinitely large migration cost, then she
is immobile. Following [1], we do not make any restriction on the correlation between skills and
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migration costs.
The skill density function in country i, fi(w) = F ′i (w) > 0, is assumed to be differentiable for
all w ∈ [w,w] and is single-peaked, with a mode at wm. For each skill w, gi(m|w) denotes the
conditional density of the migration cost andGi(m|w) =
∫ m
0
gi(x|w)dx the conditional cumulative
distribution function. The initial joint density of (m,w) is thus gi(m|w)fi(w) whileGi(m|w)fi(w)
is the mass of workers of skill w with migration costs lower than m.
Government A Government BNashStackelberg
Workers Workers
Tax Tax
Migration
Figure 2.1: Agents and Relationships
Following [19], governments do not observe workers’ types (w,m) and can only condition
transfers on earnings y via an income tax function, Ti(·), for i = A,B. By assumption, taxes are
levied according to the residence principle. In an open economy with international labor mobility,
migration threat actually induces tax competition between these two governments, and we consider
both Nash and Stackelberg competition (see Figure 2.1).
2.2.1 Individual Choices
Assume that all workers have the same additively separable utility function. So, for a worker
of type (w,m) in country i:
u(ci(w), li(w);µi, µ−i,m) = v(ci(w))− h(li(w)) + ψ(µi, µ−i)− I ·m, (2.1)
9
where ci is consumption, li is labor (and 1 − li is leisure), I is equal to 1 if she decides to migrate
and to 0 otherwise, µi is a domestic comparison consumption level, and µ−i is a cross-country
comparison consumption level, with v′ > 0 ≥ v′′, h′ > 0 and h′′ > 0. Following common
practice6, comparison consumption levels are constructed as follows:
µi =
∫ w
w
ci(w)fi(w)dw, (2.2)
for i ∈ {A,B}. For later use, we give the following two assumptions.
Assumption 2.2.1 (Bounded Jealousy). For ψi(µi, µ−i) ≡ ∂ψ/∂µi < 0, ψ−i(µi, µ−i) ≡ ∂ψ/∂µ−i
< 0, i ∈ {A,B} and w ∈ [w,w], we have max{|ψi(µi, µ−i)|, |ψ−i(µi, µ−i)|} < v′(ci(w)).
Assumption 2.2.2 (Bounded Altruism). For ψi(µi, µ−i) > 0, ψ−i(µi, µ−i) > 0, i ∈ {A,B} and
w ∈ [w,w], we have max{ψi(µi, µ−i), ψ−i(µi, µ−i)} < v′(ci(w)).
Assumptions 2.2.1-2.2.2 state that the utility contribution of relative consumption is strictly
smaller than that of absolute consumption, no matter the worker exhibits jealousy- or altruism-
type relative consumption. These assumptions are consistent with general intuition as well as real
data (see [13]).
The worker obtains her income from wages, with income denoted by yi ≡ wli(w) ≥ 0. Her
budget constraint is thus:
ci(w) = yi(w)− Ti(yi(w)). (2.3)
Each worker is assumed to be small relative to the whole economy, and hence she takes µi and µ−i
as exogenously given. If she stays in country i, she maximizes (2.1) subject to I = 0 and (2.3),
yielding the first-order condition:
h′(li(w))
wv′(ci(w))
= 1− T ′i (yi(w)). (2.4)
We denote by Ui(w) her indirect utility.
6See, e.g., [40], [8] and [37].
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We now proceed to her migration decision. As is obvious, migration occurs if and only if
m < U−i(w) − Ui(w). As in [1], after combining the migration decisions made by workers born
in both countries, the mass of residents of skill w in country i can be written as:
φi(∆i(w);w) ≡

fi(w) +G−i(∆i(w)|w)f−i(w)n−i for ∆i(w) ≥ 0,
(1−Gi(−∆i(w)|w))fi(w) for ∆i(w) ≤ 0.
(2.5)
with ∆i(w) ≡ Ui(w) − U−i(w). To ensure that φi(·;w) is differentiable, we impose the technical
restriction that gi(0|w)fi(w) = g−i(0|w)f−i(w)n−i, which is verified when the two countries are
symmetric or when there is a fixed cost of migration, namely gi(0|w) = g−i(0|w) = 0. We can
then define the semi-elasticity of migration and the elasticity of migration, respectively, as:
ηi(∆i(w);w) ≡ ∂φi(∆i(w);w)
∂∆i
1
φi(∆i(w);w)
(2.6)
and
θi(∆i(w);w) ≡ ci(w)ηi(∆i(w);w). (2.7)
For later use, and also to save on notations, we let f˜i(w) ≡ φi(∆i(w);w), η˜i(w) ≡ ηi(∆i(w);w)
and θ˜i(w) ≡ θi(∆i(w);w).
2.2.2 Governments
In country i ∈ {A,B}, a benevolent government designs the tax system to maximize the wel-
fare of the worst-off workers. By using (2.1) and (2.4), it is easy to show that Ui(w) = min{Ui(w) :
w ∈ [w,w]}. That is, the worst-off are exactly those workers with wage rate w at the bottom of the
skill distribution.
We choose maximin as the social objective due to the following considerations. First, many
jobs of the workers of the lowest skills are at the bottom of global value chain and character-
ized as low-paid, insecure and dangerous (see [43]). Second, they have the lowest migration (or
foot-voting) ability, as migration rates increase in skill (see [44]). Third, especially for those in
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developed countries, the worst-off may be even worse in an open economy because they may lose
jobs in the global competition with those workers of the lowest skills in developing countries.
And fourth, as a normative criterion, maximin is a crucial principle in achieving the social justice
suggested by Rawls [39].
As is canonical, each government faces two sorts of constraints. The first is the fiscal budget
constraint: ∫ w
w
Ti(yi(w))φi(Ui(w)− U−i(w);w)dw ≥ R, (2.8)
where R ≥ 0 is an exogenous revenue requirement. As vc(·) > 0, (2.8) must be binding. In partic-
ular, here the participation constraint has been incorporated into the fiscal budget constraint (2.8)
through the ex post skill density φi. The second is the set of incentive-compatibility constraints:
v(ci(w))− h(yi(w)/w) ≥ v(ci(w′))− h(yi(w′)/w) ∀w,w′ ∈ [w,w]. (2.9)
The necessary conditions for (2.9) to be satisfied are:
U˙i(w) = h
′(li(w))
li(w)
w
∀w ∈ [w,w], (2.10)
which gives the first-order incentive compatibility (FOIC) conditions. Sufficiency is guaranteed
by the second-order incentive compatibility (SOIC) conditions, y˙i(w) ≥ 0. If y˙i(w) > 0, then the
first-order approach is appropriate.
As a result, optimal tax design is equivalent to solve the following maximization problem:
max
{Ui(w),li(w),µi}
Ui(w)
subject to (2.2), (2.8), (2.10) and y˙i(w) ≥ 0.
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2.3 Nash Equilibrium
2.3.1 Optimal Tax Formula
We state the first major result in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.1. In a Nash equilibrium with y˙i(w) > 0, the second-best marginal tax rates verify:
T ′i (yi(w))
1− T ′i (yi(w))
=
Pigouvian-type tax︷ ︸︸ ︷
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
+
Mirrleesian-type tax︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ai(w)Bi(w)Ci(w) (2.11)
where: Ai(w) ≡ 1 + [li(w)h′′(li)/h′(li)], Bi(w) ≡
[
F˜i(w)− F˜i(w)
]
/wf˜i(w),
Ci(w) ≡
v′(ci(w))
∫ w
w
{
1
v′(ci(t))
[
1 + γi
λi
fi(t)
f˜i(t)
]
− Ti(yi(t))η˜i(t)
}
f˜i(t)dt
F˜i(w)− F˜i(w)
(2.12)
and
γi
λi
=
− ∫ w
w
ψi(µi,µ−i)
v′(ci(w))
f˜i(w)dw
1 +
∫ w
w
ψi(µi,µ−i)
v′(ci(w))
fi(w)dw
(2.13)
with F˜i(w) ≡
∫ w
w
f˜i(t)dt denoting the ex post skill distribution in country i ∈ {A,B}. Moreover,
if T ′i (yi(w)) is non-increasing in w, then the SOIC conditions are not binding, namely y˙i(w) > 0
holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Our optimal tax formula (2.11) differs from the classic one derived by Diamond [45] and Saez
[46] in three ways: (i) the ex post density f˜i(·) of taxpayers replaces the ex ante density fi(·), (ii)
tax liability Ti(yi(·)) enters term Ci(w) as a tax level effect, and (iii) there is a Pigouvian tax used
to correct consumption externalities. Also, (i) and (ii) constitute new features relative to K&T. As
is clear soon, these differences lead to qualitative and quantitative analyses much more challenging
than what we have seen in the literature.
To intuitively interpret the optimal tax formula (2.11), we investigate the effects of a small tax
reform, as shown in Figure 2.2, in a unilaterally deviating country i: the second-best marginal
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yT (y)
Initial tax schedule
0
y(w)− δ y(w)
Perturbated tax schedule
∆T (y) = δτ
τ
Substitution effect (-)
Tax liability effect(+):
•Mechanical effect (+)
•Migration response (-)
• Income effect (-)
Figure 2.2: A Small Tax Reform Perturbation (e.g., [1])
tax rates T ′i (yi(w)) are uniformly increased by a small amount τ > 0 on the income interval
[yi(w)− δ, yi(w)] for some small constant δ > 0. As a consequence, tax liabilities above yi(w) are
uniformly increased by δτ . This gives rise to the following effects.
First, a worker with income in [yi(w)−δ, yi(w)] responds to the rise in the marginal tax rate by a
substitution effect between leisure and labor, which hence reduces the taxes she pay. Second, each
worker with skills above w faces a lump-sum increase δτ in her tax liability, which is called the
mechanical effect in the literature (e.g., [46]). Since the unilateral rise in tax liability reduces her
indirect utility in the deviating country, compared to its competitor, the number of labor outflow
increases and hence the number of taxpayers with skills above w decreases. Following [1], we
define the tax liability effect as the sum of the mechanical and migration effects for all skill levels
above w. And third, the increase in tax liability tightens the consumption budget, and hence it
follows from (2.12) that income effect will in turn reduce the positive mechanical effect. Since
the optimal tax formula (2.11) is derived based on the Nash equilibrium, any unilateral deviation
14
we consider cannot induce any first-order effect on the tax revenue of the deviating country. This
implies that the tax liability effect must be positive so that the substitution effect is offset by the
tax liability effect.
Figure 2.3: ATR and MTR in a Symmetric Nash equilibrium
To see how relativity changes the average tax rate (ATR)7 and marginal tax rate (MTR), we
also numerically solve the optimal tax formula (2.11) under the following assumptions (see Figure
2.3). First, these two countries are assumed to symmetric. Second, following [47], we put the mode
wm = $19, 800 and the highest skill level w = $40, 748 with workers within this income interval
having a Pareto income distribution, with density function f(w) = awam/w
a+1 for wm ≤ w ≤ w.
Third, we use the quasilinear-in-consumption preference with a constant elasticity of labor supply,
formally ui = ci− l1+
1
ε
i /
(
1 + 1
ε
)
+σDµi+σFµ−i with σD, σF ∈ (−1, 0). And fourth, also similar
to the distribution assumption used by [47], we let the conditional distribution of migration costs
be logistic:
G(0|w) = exp(−χw)
1 + exp(−χw) for χ ∈ (0, 1).
Parameter values for simulation are given by ε = 0.25, a = 2,8 χ = 0.5, l = 0.33 and σD ∈
7Since it is impossible to solve for a formula of ATR in the current context, we rely on numerical simulation to see
the shape of ATR and how it changes with respect to the change of the degree of consumption relativity.
8See, e.g., [29], [8] and [47].
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(−1, 0). It follows from Figure 2.3 that both ATR and MTR increase as the degree of relative
consumption concern |σD| increases, for any w ∈ [wm, w].
2.3.2 Qualitative Properties
To derive the qualitative properties of the optimal tax formula established in Theorem 2.3.1, we
follow the approach developed by [47] and start by considering the same problem as in the second
best, except that skillsw are common knowledge, so migration costsm remain private information.
Using the same terminology as used by [1], we call this benchmark the Tiebout best.
Lemma 2.3.1. In a Nash equilibrium, we have the following predictions:
(i) The Tiebout-best tax liabilities are given by
T ∗i (yi(w)) =
1
v′(ci(w))η˜i(w)
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]
for ∀i ∈ {A,B}, ∀w ∈ (w,w], with an upward jump discontinuity at w.
(ii) The Tiebout-best marginal tax rates verify:
T ∗
′
i (yi(w))
1− T ∗′i (yi(w))
=
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
∀w ∈ [w,w]
with γi/λi given in Theorem 2.3.1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Under jealousy-type consumption comparison, it follows from (2.13) that γi/λi > 0. So for all
skills but the bottom skill, the Tiebout-best tax liabilities under jealousy are strictly decreasing in
the elasticity of migration, as shown in part (i). In addition, if the revenue requirement R is suffi-
ciently small, then it follows from the fiscal-budget constraint (2.8) that the worst-off workers re-
ceive net transfers in the Tiebout-best economy. However, we have γi/λi < 0 under altruism-type
consumption comparison, so the Tiebout-best tax liabilities are strictly decreasing in the elastic-
ity of migration and the worst-off workers receive net transfers only when f˜i(w)/fi(w) > −γi/λi,
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namely either the amount of labor flow is bounded below or the degree of consumption comparison
is bounded above. As shown in part (ii), the Tiebout-best marginal tax rates are used for correcting
consumption externality as well as attracting labor inflow. In particular, tax rates are strictly posi-
tive under jealousy while strictly negative under altruism. Also, the ex ante to ex post density ratio
fi(w)/f˜i(w) and jealousy comparison impose a complementary effect while this ratio and altruism
comparison impose a substitutive effect on the Tiebout-best tax liabilities and tax rates.
The following proposition gives a complete characterization of the second-best tax schedules
under jealousy-type consumption comparison.
Proposition 2.3.1. Suppose Assumption 2.2.1 holds, then the optimal tax structure in the Nash
equilibrium has the following characteristics:
(i) If Ti(yi(w)) ≤ T ∗i (yi(w)) for ∀w ∈ (w,w), then T ′i (yi(w)) > 0 for ∀w ∈ (w,w).
(ii) T ′i (yi(w)) > T
∗′
i (yi(w)) > 0 and T
′
i (yi(w)) = T
∗′
i (yi(w)) > 0 for w <∞.
(iii) If h(·) is isoelastic, fi(w)/f˜i(w) is decreasing in w, and Ti(yi(w)) ≤ T ∗i (yi(w))
for ∀w ∈ [w,w], then we have:
(a) T ′i (yi(w)) is decreasing for w ≤ wm; and
(b) T ′i (yi(w)) is decreasing for w > wm when wfi(w) is non-decreasing in w.
(iv) If fi(w)/f˜i(w) is non-increasing in w, −v′′(ci(w))c˙i(w)v′(ci(w)) ≤
˙˜ηi(w)
η˜i(w)
, and there exists a
w˜ ∈ (w,w) such that T ′i (yi(w˜)) ≥ 0, then
Ti(yi(w)) <

T ∗i (yi(w)) for w < w ≤ w˜,
1
v′(ci(w))η˜i(w)
[
1 + γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]
for w = w.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Parts (i)-(ii) identify (sufficient) conditions such that the second-best marginal tax rates are
strictly positive over the entire income distribution. In particular, if tax liabilities are bounded
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above by the Tiebout-best tax liabilities, then the second-best marginal tax rates are strictly positive
for almost all skills. Part (iii) identifies conditions such that the SOIC conditions are not binding,
namely the first-order approach is reliable. Part (iv) identifies a sufficient condition such that the
second-best tax liabilities are bounded above by the Tiebout-best tax liabilities.
The following proposition gives a complete characterization of the second-best tax schedules
under altruism-type consumption comparison.
Proposition 2.3.2. Suppose Assumption 2.2.2 holds, then the optimal tax structure in the Nash
equilibrium has the following characteristics:
(i) T ′i (yi(w)) > T
∗′
i (yi(w)) and T
′
i (yi(w)) = T
∗′
i (yi(w)) < 0 for w <∞.
(ii) Let Γi(w) ≡ 1 + γiλi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
. If Γi(w) ≥ 0 and Γ˙i(w) ≥ Γi(w) ˙˜ηi(w)η˜i(w) , then we have
(a) Ai(w)Bi(w)Ci(w) > 0 for ∀w ∈ (w,w);
(b) Ti(yi(w)) < T ∗i (yi(w));
(c) Ti(yi(w)) > Γi(w)/[v′(ci(w))η˜i(w)].
Proof. See Appendix A.
For the worst-off workers, the second-best marginal tax rates under altruism comparison are
strictly higher than the corresponding Tiebout-best marginal tax rates. For the top-income work-
ers with bounded skill distribution, the second-best marginal tax rates under altruism comparison
are equal to the corresponding Tiebout-best marginal tax rates and are strictly negative. Part (ii)
identifies mild conditions such that the following conclusions hold: (a) the Mirrleesian-type tax in
the optimal tax formula (2.11) is strictly positive for all skills but the endpoints; (b) for top-income
workers, the second-best tax liabilities are strictly smaller than the Tiebout-best tax liabilities; and
(c) there is a lower bound of the second-best tax liabilities for the worst-off workers.
The following proposition establishes a closed-form formula of the optimal asymptotic tax
rates (or the tax rates placed on top-income workers) under certain conditions.
Proposition 2.3.3. Suppose economic environments satisfy the following conditions:
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(a) v′(·) = 1, namely quasilinear-in-consumption preferences;
(b) h(·) is isoelastic with elastic coefficient ε > 0;
(c) Fi(w) is a Pareto distribution with w =∞ and Pareto index ai > 1.
Then, the optimal asymptotic marginal tax rate (AMTR) in a Nash equilibrium is:
T ′i (yi(∞)) =
γi
λi
αi(∞) +
[
1 + γi
λi
αi(∞)
]
(1 + ε)(1/ai)
1 + γi
λi
αi(∞) +
[
1 + γi
λi
αi(∞) + θ˜i(∞)
]
(1 + ε)(1/ai)
,
with θ˜i(∞) ≡ limw↑∞ θ˜i(w) ≥ 0 and αi(∞) ≡ limw↑∞ fi(w)f˜i(w) ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given that the optimal tax formula (2.11) is quite complicated, restrictions (a)-(c) must be
tolerated for explicitly solving for the optimal AMTR. In fact, conditions (a)-(b) are widely used in
the literature of optimal taxation, and Pareto distribution is an empirically supported assumption for
high-income workers. In the current context, the optimal AMTR is a continuously differentiable
function of five important variables: the degree of consumption comparison γi/λi, the measure
of labor flow αi(∞), the elasticity of labor supply ε, the degree of income inequality 1/ai, and
the elasticity of migration θ˜i(∞). In particular, AMTR is strictly decreasing in the elasticity of
migration.
The following two propositions characterize the composition effect of consumption relativity
and income inequality on the optimal AMTR. The composition effect can be completely different
under alternative circumstances.
Proposition 2.3.4. Suppose ψ(µi, µ−i) = σDµi + ψ˜(µ−i) for a constant σD ∈ (−1, 0), Fi(w) =
F−i(w) and ∂F˜i(∞)/∂ai = 0, then we have the following predictions.
(i) If θ˜i(∞) ≤ 1, then ∂
2T ′i (yi(∞))
∂(−σD)∂(1/ai) < 0.
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(ii) If θ˜i(∞) > 1, then
∂2T ′i (yi(∞))
∂ (−σD) ∂(1/ai)

< 0 for αi(∞) <
(
λi
γi
)
1+θ˜i(∞)+ 1+εai [1+θ˜i(∞)
2](
1+ 1+ε
ai
)
[θ˜i(∞)−1]
;
> 0 for αi(∞) >
(
λi
γi
)
1+θ˜i(∞)+ 1+εai [1+θ˜i(∞)
2](
1+ 1+ε
ai
)
[θ˜i(∞)−1]
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2.3.4 analyzes the case with jealousy-type consumption comparison. If the elas-
ticity of migration is not greater than one, then relativity and inequality play a substitutive role in
shaping AMTR. Precisely, the higher is inequality, the lower is the effect of relativity in raising
AMTR; similarly, the higher is relativity, the lower is the effect of inequality in raising AMTR.
However, if the elasticity of migration is greater than one, then relativity and inequality play a
substitutive role only when the ex post mass of top-income workers is greater than a threshold,
otherwise relativity and inequality play a complementary role in shaping the optimal AMTR.
Under similar assumptions, K&T show that relativity and inequality always play a substitutive
role in a closed economy. We show that such a conclusion depends on the elasticity of migration
and the level of migration in an open economy. So, Proposition 2.3.4 generalizes the prediction of
K&T as a special case with θ˜i(∞) = 0 and αi(∞) = 1.
Proposition 2.3.5. Suppose ψ(µi, µ−i) = σDµi + ψ˜(µ−i) for a constant σD ∈ (0, 1), Fi(w) =
F−i(w) and ∂F˜i(∞)/∂ai = 0, then we have the following predictions.
(i) If θ˜i(∞) < 1, then
∂2T ′i (yi(∞))
∂σD∂(1/ai)

< 0 for
(
−λi
γi
)
1+ 1+ε
ai
[1+θ˜i(∞)]
1+ 1+ε
ai
< αi(∞) <
(
−λi
γi
)
1+θ˜i(∞)+ 1+εai [1+θ˜i(∞)
2](
1+ 1+ε
ai
)
[1−θ˜i(∞)]
;
> 0 otherwise.
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(ii) If θ˜i(∞) = 1, then
∂2T ′i (yi(∞))
∂σD∂(1/ai)

< 0 for αi(∞) >
(
−λi
γi
)
1+2
(
1+ε
ai
)
1+ 1+ε
ai
;
> 0 for αi(∞) <
(
−λi
γi
)
1+2
(
1+ε
ai
)
1+ 1+ε
ai
.
(iii) If θ˜i(∞) > 1, then
∂2T ′i (yi(∞))
∂σD∂(1/ai)

< 0 for αi(∞) >
(
−λi
γi
)
1+ 1+ε
ai
[1+θ˜i(∞)]
1+ 1+ε
ai
;
> 0 for αi(∞) <
(
−λi
γi
)
1+ 1+ε
ai
[1+θ˜i(∞)]
1+ 1+ε
ai
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2.3.5 analyzes the composition effect of relativity and inequality on the optimal
AMTR under altruism-type consumption comparison. Compared to the case with jealousy-type
consumption comparison, the current predictions seem to be more subtle.
If the elasticity of migration is smaller than one, then relativity and inequality impose a substi-
tutive effect on AMTR only when the ex post mass of top-income workers is bounded both below
and above. Otherwise, they impose a complementary effect, namely the higher is inequality, the
higher is the effect of relativity in raising AMTR; or the higher is relativity, the higher is the effect
of inequality in raising AMTR. If the elasticity of migration is greater than or equal to one, then
relativity and inequality impose a substitutive effect on AMTR only when the ex post mass of top-
income workers is smaller than some threshold, and this threshold is heterogenous for different
values of migration elasticity.
2.4 Stackelberg Equilibrium
2.4.1 Optimal Tax Formula
Without any loss of generality, we denote by i the leader country and −i the follower country
in the current Stackelberg game. We thus state the second major result in the following theorem.
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Theorem 2.4.1. In a Stackelberg equilibrium, the optimal tax formula is the same as that in the
Nash equilibrium, except that:
γi
λi
=
∫ w
w
(
∂ci(w)
∂µi
+ ∂ci(w)
∂µ−i
∂µ−i
∂µi
)
f˜i(w)dw
1− ∫ w
w
(
∂ci(w)
∂µi
+ ∂ci(w)
∂µ−i
∂µ−i
∂µi
)
fi(w)dw
with
∂µ−i
∂µi
=
∫ w
w
∂c−i(w)
∂µi
f−i(w)dw
1− ∫ w
w
∂c−i(w)
∂µ−i
f−i(w)dw
for the leader country i.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorems 2.4.1 and 2.3.1 together demonstrate how the form of tax competition might affect
optimal tax rates. Intuitively, since the leader country takes into account the behavioral response
of the follower country in the dynamic Stackelberg game, it partially internalizes cross-country
consumption externalities, namely the additional term ∂µ−i/∂µi is in general different from zero.
2.4.2 Qualitative Properties
Using Theorem 2.4.1, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 2.4.1. If |ψi(µi, µ−i)| > |ψ−i(µi, µ−i)| for country i, then the qualitative properties (of
Nash equilibrium) established in Propositions 2.3.1-2.3.3 carry over to the current Stackelberg
equilibrium.
For additively separable functional forms ofψ(µi, µ−i), condition |ψi(µi, µ−i)| > |ψ−i(µi, µ−i)|
means that the degree of domestic consumption comparison is greater than that of cross-country
consumption comparison for workers in country i. Given the real-life observation that people are
more often to make status comparison with people who live in their social networks, this restriction
can be regarded as reasonable.
Proposition 2.4.1. If economic environments satisfy the following conditions:
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(a) The utility function of relative consumptions has the form:
ψ(µi, µ−i) =

σDµi + σFµ−i for country i,
σDµ−i + σFµi for country −i
with coefficients σD, σF ∈ (−1, 0) ∪ (0, 1) and |σF |+ |σD| < 1;
(b) Fi(w) = F−i(w);
(c) ∂F˜i(∞)/∂ai = 0.
Then, for the optimal AMTR of leader country i in a Stackelberg equilibrium, the predictions
established in Propositions 2.3.4-2.3.5 carry over to the current equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Provided that we have assumed quasilinear-in-consumption preferences in solving for the op-
timal AMTR, condition (a) is thus a natural restriction. Condition (b) simplifies our analysis by
eliminating asymmetry between these two countries, which however is not an essential require-
ment for establishing the current prediction. Condition (c) is a technical assumption mainly for
the purpose of simplicity. The main message implied by Proposition 2.4.1 is that the composition
effect of relativity and inequality imposed on the optimal AMTR is in general the same under both
forms of tax competition, even though the corresponding AMTRs are in general different.
Proposition 2.4.2. If Assumption 2.2.1 holds, then the government of the leader country imposes
a higher marginal tax rate in the Stackelberg equilibrium than that in the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, since jealousy implies negative consumption externality and marginal tax rates
strictly increase as externality increases, the leader country who (partially) internalizes cross-
country consumption externalities imposes a higher tax rate than that it may impose in a simultaneous-
move static game where no one internalizes cross-country consumption externalities.
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2.5 Numerical Illustration
In this section we provide some numerical examples on the optimal AMTR established in
Proposition 2.3.3. Although these exercises are very coarse, they indeed enable us to see quan-
titatively how large the difference on the optimal AMTR can be made by the effects of strategic
tax competition and cross-country consumption comparisons, when compared to what K&T have
obtained in a closed economy through ignoring these effects.
For simplicity, we use the linear utility function of relative consumptions shown in condition (a)
of Proposition 2.4.1. The following tables present AMTRs for different parameter values, when the
Pareto index ai = 2 and 3, the coefficient of domestic relative consumption σD = −0.5, 0 and 0.5,
and the elasticity of labor supply ε = 0.25, 0.33, and 0.5. We consider three elasticity scenarios.
The first two with ε = 0.25 and 0.33 are realistic midrange estimates (see [48]), while ε = 0.5 is a
little bit larger than the current average empirical estimates. We consider two inequality scenarios.
The first one with ai = 2 is based on the 2005 U.S. empirical income distribution (see [29]), while
ai = 3 is chosen to be larger than this realistic number to represent an experimental scenario with
more equal income distribution.
Moreover, we consider three relativity scenarios. σD = 0 denotes the benchmark case without
relative consumption, whereas σD = −0.5 measures the degree of jealousy and σD = 0.5 measures
the degree of altruism. One of the key findings of the empirical research on relativity is that the
estimated coefficient on income (consumption) and income comparison is statistically almost equal
and opposite (see, e.g., [11]). Given the assumption of quasi-linear preferences, σD = −0.5 seems
to be reasonable. In fact, it is consistent with the finding of [10] who use survey-experimental
methods to see how much we care about absolute versus relative income and consumption. We
choose σD = 0.5 for the sake of comparing with the case with σD = −0.5. By assumption, the
degree of cross-country social comparisons is smaller than that of domestic social comparisons, so
we let σ2F = 0.04
9 in what follows. Following [18], we let the value of the elasticity of migration
be 0.25, i.e., θ˜i(∞) = 0.25. We summarize all realistic parameter values in Table 2.1.
9In fact, we have not found any realistic estimates of this parameter in empirical literature.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Value Description Source/Target
θ˜i(∞) 0.25 Migration elasticity Piketty & Saez [18]
ε (0.1,0.4) Labor-supply elasticity Saez et al. [48]
ai 2 Pareto index Diamond & Saez [29]
σD -0.5 Domestic relativity Clark et al. [13]
σF -0.2 Cross-country relativity |σF | < |σD|
If ∆i(∞) ≥ 0, namely top-income workers get an indirect utility in country i which is not less
than that they can get in the other country −i, then the density ratio αi(∞) must not be greater
than 1. That is, country i has the potential to attract more high-skill workers from the opponent
country−i. Similarly, if ∆i(∞) ≤ 0, then the density ratio αi(∞) must not be smaller than 1. The
following tables consider both cases.
2.5.1 A Comparison with K&T
In Tables 2.3-2.10, we use red numbers to denote the optimal AMTRs calculated using the
formula of K&T. In both types of equilibrium, we obtain the following findings under different
values of αi(∞). In particular, negative numbers imply that workers receive transfers, which
occurs only when workers exhibit altruism-type relative consumption preferences.
First, for each given labor-supply elasticity and given degree of relative consumption, AMTR
increases as inequality increases. Second, for each given degree of inequality and given degree of
relative consumption, AMTR increases as elasticity increases. And third, for each given elasticity
and given degree of inequality, AMTR significantly increases under jealousy and significantly
declines under altruism, compared to the benchmark case without relative consumption concerns.
We summarize the economic mechanism in Table 2.2, in which the superscripts of MTRO and
MTRC denote open-economy and closed-economy, respectively. In particular, we just consider the
MTR of the leader country under Stackelberg tax competition. Essentially, as already shown in
Table 2.2, relativity and migration are determinant factors in such a comparison.
Since no one internalizes the cross-country consumption externality under Nash competition,
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Table 2.2: Economic Mechanism Governing Quantitative Findings
Nash Nash Stack Stack
Relativity effect = = > >
Migration effect Small Large Small Large
MTRO Labor inflow < << > << MTRC
MTRO Labor outflow < >> > >> MTRC
the relativity effect on MTR is the same between an open economy and a closed economy. In con-
trast, as the leader country internalizes cross-country consumption externality under Stackelberg
competition, the relativity effect on MTR implemented by the leader country in an open econ-
omy should be greater than that in a closed economy. Therefore, if there is no migration between
countries, only the MTR implemented under Stackelberg competition should be higher than that
implemented in a closed economy.
For comparing MTRO and MTRC under Nash, migration effect dominates relativity effect. If
labor flow is small, no matter it is inflow or outflow, Nash competition implies a smaller MTR than
that in a closed economy without any migration threat imposed on the government. Nevertheless,
if labor flow is large, then migration effect is heterogenous between the case with labor inflow and
the case with labor outflow. Precisely, large labor inflow must be induced by a much lower MTR
compared to MTRC , while large labor outflow must be induced by a much higher MTR compared
to MTRC .
For comparing MTRO and MTRC under Stackelberg, both relativity effect and migration effect
matter. If labor flow is small, then relativity effect dominates migration effect for both the case with
labor inflow and the case with labor outflow, implying that MTRO under Stackelberg competition
should be higher than MTRC . However, if labor flow is large, then migration effect dominates
relativity effect and it is heterogenous between the case with labor inflow and the case with labor
outflow. Precisely, large labor inflow must be induced by a much lower MTR compared to MTRC ,
while large labor outflow must be induced by a much higher MTR compared to MTRC . As a result,
under a large labor flow, the prediction is the same between Nash and Stackelberg tax competition.
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Figure 2.4: For αi(∞) = 0.5, ε = θ˜i(∞) = 0.25, ai > 1, σD ∈ (−1, 0)
Figure 2.5: For αi(∞) = 2, ε = θ˜i(∞) = 0.25, ai > 1, σD ∈ (−1, 0)
2.5.1.1 Nash vs. K&T
Tables 2.3-2.6 compare optimal AMTRs in Nash equilibrium with those in K&T. They show
that the difference on AMTRs increases as the net level of migration increases, precisely as αi(∞)
declines under ∆i(∞) ≥ 0 and as αi(∞) increases under ∆i(∞) ≤ 0. In particular, we can
obtain under symmetry between these two countries that αi(∞) = 0.67 ⇐⇒ Pr(m < Ui(∞) −
U−i(∞)) = 49% and αi(∞) = 2.00 ⇐⇒ Pr(m < U−i(∞) − Ui(∞)) = 50%, namely the
migration probability is around 50% at these values of αi(∞). Under jealousy-type relativity with
∆i(∞) ≥ 0, Nash AMTRs are always smaller than those in K&T (see Figure 2.4). However, if
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∆i(∞) ≤ 0, they are greater than those in K&T when αi(∞) is larger than some critical value (see
Figure 2.5). Under altruism-type relativity with ∆i(∞) ≥ 0, they are always greater than those
in K&T. However, if ∆i(∞) ≤ 0, they are always smaller than those in K&T. Also, if there is
no relative consumption concern, then they are always smaller than those in K&T. Moreover, the
migration effect is magnified by consumption comparison.
Table 2.3: AMTR (%) under ∆i(∞) ≥ 0 with αi(∞) = 0.95
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.5
ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3
σD = −0.5 65.2,69.2 61.5,64.7 65.8,70.0 62.0,65.4 67.0,71.4 63.1,66.7
σD = 0 35.1,38.5 27.4,29.4 36.3,39.9 28.5,30.7 38.7,42.9 30.8,33.3
σD = 0.5 8.7,7.7 -3.0,-5.9 10.6,9.9 -1.3,-3.9 14.2,14.3 2.2,0.0
Table 2.4: AMTR (%) under ∆i(∞) ≥ 0 with αi(∞) = 0.67
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.5
ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3
σD = −0.5 59.7,69.2 55.3,64.7 60.4,70.0 55.9,65.4 61.8,71.4 57.2,66.7
σD = 0 35.1,38.5 27.4,29.4 36.3,39.9 28.5,30.7 38.7,42.9 30.8,33.3
σD = 0.5 18.5,7.7 8.3,-5.9 20.1,9.9 9.8,-3.9 23.2,14.3 12.8,0.0
Table 2.5: AMTR (%) under ∆i(∞) ≤ 0 with αi(∞) = 1.05
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.5
ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3
σD = −0.5 66.8,69.2 63.3,64.7 67.4,70.0 63.8,65.4 68.5,71.4 64.8,66.7
σD = 0 35.1,38.5 27.4,29.4 36.3,39.9 28.5,30.7 38.7,42.9 30.8,33.3
σD = 0.5 4.6,7.7 -7.7,-5.9 6.6,9.9 -5.9,-3.9 10.4,14.3 -2.2,0.0
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Table 2.6: AMTR (%) under ∆i(∞) ≤ 0 with αi(∞) = 1.55
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.5
ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3
σD = −0.5 73.1,69.2 70.3,64.7 73.6,70.0 70.7,65.4 74.5,71.4 71.5,66.7
σD = 0 35.1,38.5 27.4,29.4 36.3,39.9 28.5,30.7 38.7,42.9 30.8,33.3
σD = 0.5 -22.8,7.7 -40.0,-5.9 -20.1,9.9 -37.4,-3.9 -14.9,14.3 -32.4,0.0
2.5.1.2 Stackelberg vs. K&T
Figure 2.6: For αi(∞) = 0.5, ε = θ˜i(∞) = 0.25, ai > 1, σD < 0, σ2F = 0.04
Tables 2.7-2.10 compare optimal AMTRs in Stackelberg equilibrium, denoted by blue num-
bers, with those in K&T. The difference on AMTRs increases as the net level of migration in-
creases, precisely as αi(∞) declines under ∆i(∞) ≥ 0 and as αi(∞) increases under ∆i(∞) ≤ 0.
Under jealousy-type relativity with ∆i(∞) ≤ 0, Stackelberg AMTRs are in general larger than
those in K&T (see Figure 2.7). However, if ∆i(∞) ≥ 0, they are smaller than those in K&T
for αi(∞) smaller than some critical value (see Figure 2.6). Under altruism-type relativity with
∆i(∞) ≥ 0, they are always greater than those in K&T. However, if ∆i(∞) ≤ 0, they are always
smaller than those in K&T.
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Figure 2.7: For αi(∞) = 2, ε = θ˜i(∞) = 0.25, ai > 1, σD < 0, σ2F = 0.04
Table 2.7: AMTR (%) under ∆i(∞) ≥ 0 with αi(∞) = 0.95
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.5
ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3
σD = −0.5 70.5,69.2 67.3,64.7 71.0,70.0 67.8,65.4 71.9,71.4 68.7,66.7
σD = 0 37.4,38.5 30.0,29.4 38.5,39.9 31.1,30.7 40.8,42.9 33.2,33.3
σD = 0.5 10.0,7.7 -1.4,-5.9 11.9,9.9 0.3,-3.9 15.4,14.3 3.6,0.0
Table 2.8: AMTR (%) under ∆i(∞) ≥ 0 with αi(∞) = 0.55
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.5
ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3
σD = −0.5 61.7,69.2 57.5,64.7 62.3,70.0 58.1,65.4 63.6,71.4 59.3,66.7
σD = 0 36.4,38.5 28.9,29.4 38.5,39.9 31.1,30.7 40.8,42.9 33.2,33.3
σD = 0.5 22.6,7.7 13.1,-5.9 24.1,9.9 14.5,-3.9 27.1,14.3 17.3,0.0
2.5.2 Nash vs. Stackelberg: the Leader Country
Tables 2.11-2.12 illustrate Proposition 2.4.2 by comparing AMTRs under these two types of
equilibrium. As is obvious, no matter ∆i(∞) ≥ 0 or ∆i(∞) ≤ 0, these AMTRs in Nash equilib-
rium are in general smaller than those in Stackelberg equilibrium (see also Figures 2.8-2.9).
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Table 2.9: AMTR (%) under ∆i(∞) ≤ 0 with αi(∞) = 1.05
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.5
ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3
σD = −0.5 72.1,69.2 69.1,64.7 72.5,70.0 69.5,65.4 73.5,71.4 70.4,66.7
σD = 0 37.6,38.5 30.2,29.4 38.8,39.9 31.3,30.7 41.0,42.9 33.5,33.3
σD = 0.5 6.2,7.7 -5.9,-5.9 8.1,9.9 -4.1,-3.9 11.9,14.3 -0.5,0.0
Table 2.10: AMTR (%) under ∆i(∞) ≤ 0 with αi(∞) = 1.55
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.5
ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3
σD = −0.5 78.0,69.2 75.7,64.7 78.4,70.0 76.1,65.4 79.1,71.4 76.7,66.7
σD = 0 38.7,38.5 31.5,29.4 38.8,39.9 31.3,30.7 41.0,42.9 33.5,33.3
σD = 0.5 -18.9,7.7 -35.4,-5.9 -16.4,9.9 -33.0,-3.9 -11.4,14.3 -28.1,0.0
Figure 2.8: For αi(∞) = 0.5, ε = θ˜i(∞) = 0.25, ai > 1, σD < 0, σ2F = 0.04
2.6 Conclusion
In this essay, we develop a theoretical framework to analyze how the interplay of relative con-
sumption concern and income inequality determines optimal income taxes in an international set-
ting with two competing countries. We establish and qualitatively characterize nonlinear labor
income tax schedules that competing Rawlsian governments should implement when workers hav-
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Figure 2.9: For αi(∞) = 2, ε = θ˜i(∞) = 0.25, ai > 1, σD < 0, σ2F = 0.04
Table 2.11: AMTR (%) under ∆i(∞) ≥ 0 with αi(∞) = 0.95
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.5
ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3
σD = −0.5 65.2,70.5 61.5,67.3 65.8,71.0 62.0,67.8 67.0,71.9 63.1,68.7
σD = 0 35.1,37.4 27.4,30.0 36.3,38.5 28.5,31.1 38.7,40.8 30.8,33.2
σD = 0.5 8.7,10.0 -3.0,-1.4 10.6,11.9 -1.3,0.3 14.2,15.4 2.2,3.6
Table 2.12: AMTR (%) under ∆i(∞) ≤ 0 with αi(∞) = 1.05
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.33 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.5
ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3 ai = 2 ai = 3
σD = −0.5 66.8,72.1 63.3,69.1 67.4,72.5 63.8,69.5 68.5,73.5 64.8,70.4
σD = 0 35.1,37.6 27.4,30.2 36.3,38.8 28.5,31.3 38.7,41.0 30.8,33.5
σD = 0.5 4.6,6.2 -7.7,-5.9 6.6,8.1 -5.9,-4.1 10.4,11.9 -2.2,-0.5
ing private information on skills and migration costs decide where to live and how much to work.
In addition to the case where governments play Nash, we also examine the scenario where they
play Stackelberg.
Firstly, we obtain an optimal tax formula that can be interpreted as a nontrivial generalization
of those obtained by [45], [46], [8], [1] and [37]. Secondly, we numerically calculate optimal
AMTRs under both types of equilibrium and compare them to those obtained using the formula
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of K&T, finding that the country with large labor inflow imposes a much smaller marginal tax
rate and the country with large labor outflow imposes a much higher marginal tax rate than sug-
gested by K&T. This finding holds for sufficiently various combinations of parameters measuring
relative consumption, labor mobility and income inequality. Thirdly, for the case with quasilinear-
in-consumption preferences and jealousy-type consumption comparison, we show that the leader
country imposes a higher marginal tax rate in Stackelberg equilibrium than that it may impose
in Nash equilibrium. And fourthly, we provide a complete characterization on how relativity and
inequality together determine the optimal AMTR under both Nash and Stackelberg tax competi-
tion, finding that both the elasticity and level of migration are determinant for predicting when
relativity and inequality are complementary or substitutive in shaping the optimal tax rates placed
on top-income workers.
We, therefore, show that the optimal redistributive taxation policy for countries involved in
globalization should not ignore these important effects resulted from tax-driven migrations as well
as the interplay of relativity and inequality. Since alternative forms of tax competition generate
heterogenous effects on optimal tax rates, the identification of the form of tax competition should
be of practical relevance, which however awaits future research.
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3. VOTING OVER SELFISHLY OPTIMAL INCOME TAX SCHEDULES WITH
TAX-DRIVEN MIGRATIONS
3.1 Introduction
As barriers to labor mobility have been lowered and education and language skills have im-
proved, governments are facing the challenge that the base of labor income tax is becoming more
mobile. This is especially true for highly skilled workers. For example, [3], [4] and [5] estimate
large migration elasticities with respect to income tax rate for these types of workers.
To analyze how the possibility of geographic mobility affects the design of redistributive taxa-
tion, the literature (see, e.g., [15], [16], [17], [18], [1]) that builds on the seminal work of Mirrlees
[19] focuses on the normative perspective. Little attention has been paid to the positive perspective.
We hence address this question: how would the schedule of redistributive taxation look like when
workers can vote both in the ballot box and with their feet? In particular, answering this ques-
tion allows us to reexamine the conventional wisdom (see [20]) claiming that geographic mobility
limits the ability of government to redistribute incomes via a tax-transfer system.
To our knowledge, the answer is not yet well established. Indeed, the literature either assumes
away asymmetric information (e.g., [21], [22]), restricts attention to flat tax (e.g., [22]) and special
connections between skills and migration costs in a two-type setting that rules out countervailing
incentives (e.g., [23]), or focuses on probabilistic voting in a representative democracy (e.g., [24]).
These simplifications make it possible to obtain sharp predictions, whereas reasonable doubts about
the generality and robustness of their predictions may arise.
Intuitively, the combination of labor mobility and majority voting results in a complex interac-
tion whereby the taxation policies chosen by competing jurisdictions determine whom they attract
and whom they attract determine their choices of taxation policies. Our goal is to answer the
above question with taking into account this interesting interaction and without resorting to those
simplifications used by the literature.
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To achieve our goal, we consider an economy consisting of two jurisdictions, between which
workers born in each one can move by paying certain amount of migration cost. In each juris-
diction, workers differ in both skill level that measures their labor productivity and migration cost
that measures their foot-voting capability. While the ex ante distribution of skill levels and the
conditional distribution of migration costs are common knowledge, the values of any worker’s la-
bor productivity and migration cost are only known to herself. As usual, taxation is based on the
residence principle1, and we focus on the Nash competition induced by the mobile tax base be-
tween these two jurisdictions. Taking as given the income taxes implemented in both jurisdictions,
workers make individual decisions along two margins: optimal labor supply on the intensive mar-
gin and optimal residence choice on the extensive margin. In particular, by allowing for location
choice, both the reservation utilities of workers and the ex post skill distribution are endogenously
determined. This feature, on one hand, enables us to design more realistic income tax schedules.
On the other hand, it makes the qualitative analysis to be much less transparent.
Following [25], [26], [27] and [14], we are interested in selfishly optimal income tax schedules.
Each worker can be viewed as a citizen candidate who can propose an income tax schedule that
maximizes the utility of her own type. Then, the pairwise majority rule is used to select the tax
schedule that is going to be implemented in equilibrium.2 Importantly, each worker proposes an
income tax schedule as if she were representing the government. Following the mechanism design
approach, each proposer must take into account individual responses along both intensive and
extensive margins and design incentive-compatible allocations satisfying the government budget
constraint.
We rely on the first-order approach in the text and leave the complete solution to the tax design
problem to Appendix B due to its complexity. By assuming quasilinear-in-consumption prefer-
ences, we show that the tax schedule proposed by the median skill type is a Condorcet winner in
1In practice, almost all countries use the residence principle. The only exceptions are the US and Israel, where the
citizens pay domestic income tax based on their global income.
2In a population with the majority consisting of “poor" individuals, Höchtl et al. [49] experimentally find that
redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest. We hence argue that it is
somewhat reasonable to focus attention on selfishly optimal income taxes in the current political economy.
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the majority rule equilibrium, which provides support for the empirical finding of [28]. They show
by using survey data that most democracies implement the preferred redistribution of the median
voter and also the probability to serve the median voter increases with the quality of democracy.
Moreover, the tax rates implemented in the experiment of [50] closely track the preferences of the
median skill worker, and the cross-national empirical evidence of [51] emphasizes the political
channel as well as the middle class in determining the extent of redistribution.
The current tax schedule exhibits the following characteristics.
First, it coincides with the maximax tax schedule for types below the median skill level and
coincides with the maximin tax schedule for types above the median skill level. We thus claim
that governments under direct democracy and majority rule tend to redistribute from both the poor
and the rich toward the middle class. This prediction not only extends the Director’s Law (see
[52]) to the circumstance with both labor mobility and inter-jurisdictional tax competition, but also
provides theoretical support for the empirical finding of [53] that all Dutch political parties give a
higher political weight to middle incomes than to the poor and the rich.
Second, marginal tax rates are negative for low incomes, whereas for higher incomes there
is an endogenously determined and skill-dependent threshold of the elasticity of migration such
that they are negative only when migration elasticity is higher than this threshold, otherwise they
are nonnegative. To some extent, this result is consistent with our intuition about the feature of
redistributive taxation. In addition, provided that income taxation in the United States is based
on citizenship principle other than residence principle, the elasticities of migration for high in-
comes may not be that large, this prediction hence explains in some sense why effective marginal
tax rates in the United States are negative for low incomes and positive for higher incomes (see
Congressional Budget Office [54]).
Third, it creates three potential discontinuities, one at the skill level of the proposer and the
other two at the endpoints of skill distribution, in the resulting income schedule. In the voting
equilibrium, there always exists a downward discontinuity at the median skill level. Importantly,
we identify the indirect utility level of the least skilled as the determinant factor of the type of
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the other two discontinuities. If it lies between a negative threshold and zero, then both of them
are downward. If it lies above zero, then one is upward at the lowest skill level and the other is
downward at the highest skill level. If, however, it lies below the negative threshold, then one is
downward at the lowest skill level and the other is upward at the highest skill level. We hence need
to build more than one bridges when we iron the tax schedule to satisfy the monotonicity constraint
placed on incomes, namely the second-order sufficient condition for incentive compatibility. As
such, truth-telling allocation calls for bunching not only in the middle-income class, but also either
in the low-income class or in the high-income class.
Fourth, by allowing for inter-jurisdictional migrations that endogenize the ex post skill distri-
bution and median skill level, the resulting level of distortion and redistribution deviates from that
under a single government. To be precise, we directly compare our tax schedule to that of [14]
derived in autarky and establish the following predictions under the same median skill level. If
migration elasticities are large for both low and high skills, then migrations induce lower marginal
tax rates and hence smaller redistributions than does autarky. If, however, their migration elastic-
ities are small, then the jurisdiction facing net labor inflow in low skills while net labor outflow
in high skills imposes higher tax rates on both low and high skills. So, high skills pay more taxes
while low skills receive less transfers than in autarky. If the median skill level is different between
migration equilibrium and autarky equilibrium, then these predictions hold for all skills but those
between these two median skill levels. The direction of change depends on which median voter is
richer (or poorer).
To complement the theoretical analysis, the model is simulated with empirical parameter es-
timates based on the U.S. data. Since the literature suggests that tax-driven migrations be more
likely to occur in the population of high skills (e.g., [44]) and the upper part of empirical income
distribution be well fitted by Pareto distribution (e.g., [46]), our simulations focus on top-income
workers. Following [55] and [29], we set the ex post Pareto index to be 1.5. For the ex ante
Pareto index in autarky (without migrations), our numerical experiments allow it to have varying
values around 1.5. The ex post and ex ante degrees of income inequality are not necessarily the
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same. To do counterfactual simulations, we manipulate the value of another parameter, which is
an approximation of the elasticity of utility with respect to pre-tax income, in our tax formula such
that it generates the current 42.5% top U.S. marginal tax rate (see [29]). Our calculation reveals
that there can be large differences of marginal tax rate between our prediction and that in autarky.
For example, for a labor supply elasticity of 0.25 (e.g., [48]), a migration elasticity of 0.25 (e.g.,
[1]) and an ex ante Pareto index of 1.5, the autarky equilibrium generates a top tax rate 34.4%
higher than the implemented 42.5%. Everything else equal, if the labor supply elasticity increases
to the highest possible estimate 0.4 (e.g., [48]), the autarky equilibrium still generates a top tax rate
27.5% higher than the implemented 42.5%. Naturally, these numbers of differences should only
be interpreted within the current economic context and be taken as providing a rough assessment
of the quantitative significance of migrations in terms of reducing equilibrium distortions imposed
on top-income workers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the relation of our paper to
the literature. Section 3.3 sets up the model of the economy. Section 3.4 derives and characterizes
selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules. Section 3.5 establishes the voting equilibrium.
Section 3.6 qualitatively and quantitatively identifies the effect of migrations on the equilibrium
schedule of marginal tax rates. Section 3.7 concludes. Proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
3.2 Literature Review
The current study relates to two strands of literature and we shall discuss one by one.
First, it relates to the literature studying selfishly optimal nonlinear taxation determined by
the majority rule,3 such as [25], [26], [27] and [14]. While Röell [25] considers the case with a
discrete skill distribution, the others use a continuum version of the Röell model. They all but
[14] impose a minimum-utility constraint, but they all demonstrate that the schedule proposed
by the median skill type is a Condorcet winner. By sacrificing the minimum-utility constraint
and assuming quasilinear-in-consumption preferences, [14] realizes a complete characterization of
3Voting over selfishly optimal tax schedules has also been studied by [56] and [57], but the former study focuses
on linear taxes and the latter study focuses on quadratic tax schedules.
38
selfishly optimal nonlinear tax schedules without calling for quite technical analysis.
By adding the location choice for workers, both the reservation utility of the standard partici-
pation constraint and the ex post skill distribution are endogenously determined. So, our extension
makes the underlying tax design issue more realistic and indeed modifies the predictions obtained
by [14] in three main ways.
Firstly, there tend to be more than one discontinuities in the tax schedule, and hence the ironing
procedure used in deriving the complete solution seems to be much more involved. Secondly,
marginal tax rates for higher incomes are not definitely positive, and they are rather negative for
workers with sufficiently large elasticities of migration. And thirdly, migrations reduce distortions
caused by marginal tax rates under a reasonable range of migration elasticities, and also the level of
redistribution is likely to be either smaller or larger than suggested by [14], depending on whether
the ex post median skill level lies at the right or at the left of the ex ante median skill level.
Second, it relates to the literature analyzing how the change of skill distribution affects equilib-
rium tax rates as well as the level of redistribution, such as [58], [23], [59], and [1]. No matter they
use discrete or continuous skill distributions, they all follow the normative approach and focus on
optimal income taxation. This paper follows the positive approach and stresses the fact that tax
schedules are, directly or indirectly, chosen by self-interested voters in democracies. In this sense,
it would be regarded as a complementary work to the literature.
3.3 The Model
We consider an economy consisting of two jurisdictions, called A and B. The measure of
workers inA is normalized to 1, while that ofB is denoted by n−, for 0 < n− ≤ 1. In what follows,
we will focus onA because similar assumptions hold forB. To save on notation, whenever needed,
we will use the subscript “−" to indicate variables associated to B. Each worker is characterized
by three characteristics: her native jurisdiction A or B, her skill (or labor productivity) w ∈ [w,w]
with 0 < w < w, and the migration cost m ∈ R+ she supports if she decides to relocate. In
particular, if she faces an infinitely large migration cost, then she is immobile. Following [1], we
do not make any restriction on the correlation between skills and migration costs. The simpler
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assumption is that migration costs and skill levels are independently distributed, as adopted by
[41] and [42]. It, nevertheless, seems to be inconsistent with the empirical finding of [44] that
migration rates increase in skill.
The ex ante skill density function, f(w) = F ′(w) > 0, is assumed to be differentiable for all
w ∈ [w,w]. For each skill w, g(m|w) denotes the conditional density of the migration cost and
G(m|w) = ∫ m
0
g(x|w)dx the conditional cumulative distribution function. The joint density of
(m,w) is thus g(m|w)f(w), and G(m|w)f(w) is the mass of workers of skill w with migration
costs lower than m.
Following [19] and [1], governments cannot observe workers’ type (w,m) and can only condi-
tion transfers on earnings y via an income tax function, T (·). As usual, taxes are levied according
to the residence principle. So, migration threat actually induces tax competition between these two
jurisdictions, and we restrict our attention to Nash competition in which each government takes
the income tax policy of the opponent as given.
A worker with skill level w produces w units of a consumption good per unit of labor time in a
perfectly competitive labor market and earns a before-tax income of
y = wl, (3.1)
in which l ≥ 0 denotes labor supply. A worker has nonnegative consumption c that is also her
after-tax income, namely
c = y − T (y). (3.2)
Preferences over consumption and labor supply are represented by the quasilinear-in-consumption
utility function4
u˜(c, l;m) = c− h(l)− I ·m,
which is common to all workers with I being equal to 1 if she decides to migrate and to 0 otherwise.
4This assumption not only simplifies the theoretical derivation but also seems to be empirically reasonable by
eliminating the income effect on taxable income (e.g., [60]).
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The disutility function h is increasing, strictly convex and three-times continuously differentiable,
and also satisfies the usual normalization h(0) = h′(0) = 0. The government can observe a
worker’s before- and after-tax incomes, but not her labor supply. Using (3.1), the utility function
in terms of observable variables is written as
u(c, y;w,m) = c− h
( y
w
)
− I ·m. (3.3)
It is easy to verify that the standard single-crossing property is satisfied.
So, the individual choice of each worker is along two margins: the intensive margin on optimal
labor supply and the extensive margin on optimal residence choice.
3.3.1 Intensive Margin
If a worker decides to stay in jurisdiction A, then she maximizes (3.3) subject to I = 0 and
(3.2), yielding the first-order condition:
T ′(y(w)) = 1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
,
whenever T is differentiable. If it is not differentiable at some incomes, then the marginal tax rate
is not well-defined. To avoid unnecessary technical issues, we follow [14] and directly define the
function of marginal tax rate as
τ(w) ≡ 1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
, ∀w ∈ [w,w]. (3.4)
That is, marginal tax rate is equal to one minus the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and income.
We then define the resulting indirect utility as
U(w) ≡ c(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
, ∀w ∈ [w,w]. (3.5)
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Incentive compatibility requires that
U(w) = max
w′∈[w,w]
c(w′)− h
(
y(w′)
w
)
, ∀w ∈ [w,w].
The necessary condition is thus
U ′(w) = h′
(
y(w)
w
)
y(w)
w2
, ∀w ∈ [w,w], (3.6)
which gives the first-order incentive compatibility (FOIC) condition. Sufficiency is guaranteed by
the second-order incentive compatibility (SOIC) condition
y′(w) ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ [w,w]. (3.7)
If constraint (3.7) does not bind, then the first-order approach is appropriate.
3.3.2 Migration Decision
For a worker of type (w,m) born in jurisdiction A, she will migrate to jurisdiction B if and
only if m < U−(w)− U(w). As in [1], after combining the migration decisions made by workers
born in both jurisdictions, the mass of residents of skill w in jurisdiction A can be written as:
φ(∆(w);w) ≡

f(w) +G−(∆(w)|w)f−(w)n− for ∆(w) ≥ 0,
(1−G(−∆(w)|w))f(w) for ∆(w) ≤ 0
(3.8)
with ∆(w) ≡ U(w) − U−(w). To ensure that φ(·;w) is differentiable, we impose the technical
restriction that g(0|w)f(w) = g−(0|w)f−(w)n−, which is verified when these two jurisdictions
are symmetric or when there is a fixed cost of migration, namely g(0|w) = g−(0|w) = 0. We can
then, as in [1], define the elasticity of migration as
θ(∆(w);w) ≡ ∂φ(∆(w);w)
∂∆(w)
c(w)
φ(∆(w);w)
(3.9)
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To save on notations, we let f˜(w) ≡ φ(∆(w);w) and θ˜(w) ≡ θ(∆(w);w).
3.4 Selfishly Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Schedules
To focus on redistributive taxation, the government budget constraint can be written as
∫ w
w
[y(w)− c(w)]f˜(w)dw ≥ 0, (3.10)
where we have used (3.2). Provided the quasi-linearity in consumption, (3.10) must be binding.
In particular, the participation constraint has been incorporated into this fiscal budget constraint
through the term of ex post skill density f˜ .
As in [27] and [14], each worker can propose an income tax schedule satisfying incentive com-
patibility constraints (3.6)-(3.7) and the government budget constraint (3.10), and then pairwise
majority rule is used to determine which of these schedules shall be implemented. That is, each
worker can be seen as a citizen candidate who may be elected as the representative agent of the
government.
By applying the Taxation Principle5 (see [61] and [62]) that allows us to restrict attention to
simple direct mechanisms6, for a worker of type k ∈ [w,w], proposing an income tax schedule is
equivalent to proposing an allocation schedule {c(w), y(w)}w∈[w,w] which solves the maximization
problem
max
{c(w),y(w)}w∈[w,w]
U(k) subject to (3.5), (3.6), (3.7) and (3.10). (3.11)
By (3.11), the resulting allocation schedule is indeed selfishly optimal for the proposer.
We leave the complete solution to Appendix B, and here we rely on the first-order approach that
considers a simpler while still useful case in which the SOIC condition (3.7) is ignored. Formally,
5It states that there is an equivalence between admissible allocations and allocations that are decentralizable via an
income tax system.
6If individual skills are drawn independently, [63] proves that the optimal sophisticated mechanism with strategic
interdependence is a simple mechanism as long as individuals exhibit decreasing risk aversion.
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problem (3.11) is relaxed as
max
{c(w),y(w)}w∈[w,w]
U(k) subject to (3.5), (3.6) and (3.10). (3.12)
Solving problem (3.12) leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.1. The selfishly optimal schedule of pre-tax incomes proposed by any worker of type
k ∈ (w,w) is given by
y(w) =

yM(w) for w = w,
yM(w) for w ∈ (w, k),
yR(w) for w ∈ (k, w),
yR(w) for w = w.
(3.13)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Since we focus on selfishly optimal income tax schedules, a proposer of type k wishes to
redistribute incomes from all other types toward her own type. To this end, for types greater than
her own, she optimally proposes the maximin income schedule, denoted by yR(·), whereas for
types smaller than her own, she optimally proposes the maximax income schedule, denoted by
yM(·).
By applying the formula (3.4) to Lemmas B.1.2 and B.1.3 stated in Appendix B and using
Theorem 3.4.1, we summarize the resulting prediction as the second theorem.
Theorem 3.4.2. The selfishly optimal income tax schedule proposed by any worker of type k ∈
(w,w) is given by
τ(w) =

τM(w) for w = w,
τM(w) for w ∈ (w, k),
τR(w) for w ∈ (k, w),
τR(w) for w = w
(3.14)
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in which these marginal tax rates are explicitly given as
τM(w) = −∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
− U(w)
]
, (3.15)
τM(w) =
Γ(w,w)− Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
[
1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w2
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
− ∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
,
(3.16)
τR(w) =
Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
[
1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w2
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
− ∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)] (3.17)
and
τR(w) = −∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
− U(w)
]
, (3.18)
with ∂f˜(w)/∂y(w) determined by equations (B.12) and (B.13) stated in Appendix B for ∀w ∈
[w,w].
These marginal tax rates depart from those obtained by [14] in two important aspects. First, in
addition to the discontinuity between the maximax tax schedule and the maximin tax schedule, we
show that there may exist another two discontinuities: one at the lowest type within the maximax
schedule and the other at the highest type within the maximin schedule. Second, as the ex post skill
distribution is endogenously determined as a function of income and consumption, the migration
decision along the extensive margin imposes non-trivial effects on these tax rates.
By using Theorem 3.4.2, we obtain the following two propositions.
Proposition 3.4.1. Regarding the sign of these marginal tax rates given by (3.15)-(3.16), we have
the following predictions.
(i) For workers of type w, we have:
(i-a) There is a threshold, written as T̂M(y(w)) ≡ −y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
= −wU ′(w) <
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0, of tax liability such that
τM(w)

< 0 for TM(y(w)) > T̂M(y(w)),
= 0 for TM(y(w)) = T̂M(y(w)),
> 0 for TM(y(w)) < T̂M(y(w));
(3.19)
(i-b) Suppose θ˜(w)·MUy(w)·Qy,c(w) 6= 1, in which MUy and Qy,c denote, respec-
tively, the marginal utility of pre-tax income and the ratio of pre-tax income
to after-tax income.
• If 0 < θ˜(w) ·MUy(w) · Qy,c(w) < 1, then
τM(w)

< 0 for ATRM(w) > −1,
= 0 for ATRM(w) = −1,
> 0 for ATRM(w) < −1;
(3.20)
• If θ˜(w) ·MUy(w) · Qy,c(w) > 1, then
τM(w)

< 0 for ATRM(w) < −1,
= 0 for ATRM(w) = −1,
> 0 for ATRM(w) > −1;
(3.21)
in which ATR denotes average tax rate.
(ii) For workers of type w ∈ (w, k), we have τM(w) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The sign of these maximax marginal tax rates departs from that of [14] as follows. Instead of
showing that the marginal tax rate is always zero for the lowest skilled, we show that it is zero only
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when their tax liability is equal to a negative critical value or when their average tax rate is equal
to -1. That is, it is more likely to be either strictly positive or strictly negative. In particular, if the
elasticity of migration for the lowest skilled is small, it is negative when their average tax rate is
relatively large and is positive when their average tax rate is relatively small, as shown in (3.20).
Proposition 3.4.2. Regarding the sign of these marginal tax rates given by (3.17)-(3.18), we have
the following predictions.
(i) For workers of type w ∈ (k, w), there is a threshold of the elasticity of migration,
written as θ˜?(w) ≡ Γ(w,w)wf˜(w)
[
c(w)
wl(w)+l(w)h′(l(w))−h(l(w))
]
> 0, such that
τR(w)

< 0 for θ˜(w) > θ˜?(w),
= 0 for θ˜(w) = θ˜?(w),
> 0 for θ˜(w) < θ˜?(w).
(3.22)
(ii) For workers of type w, we have
τR(w)

< 0 for TR(y(w)) > U(w)− U(w),
= 0 for TR(y(w)) = U(w)− U(w),
> 0 for TR(y(w)) < U(w)− U(w),
(3.23)
in which U(w)− U(w) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The sign of these maximin marginal tax rates departs from that of [14] in two ways. First,
instead of showing that the marginal tax rate is always zero for the highest skilled, we show that
it is zero only when their tax liability is equal to a negative critical value defined as the utility
difference between the lowest skilled and the highest skilled. Second, instead of showing that the
marginal tax rate is always positive for workers of types higher than the type k of the proposer,
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it is positive only when their elasticity of migration is smaller than an endogenously determined
critical value.
Intuition: Here we explain intuitively why selfishly optimal tax schedules feature negative
marginal tax rates for low skills while positive ones for high skills. Everything else being equal,
for a selfish proposer motivated to extract resources from the remaining types, the best way is to
tax more on higher skills than on lower skills. The reason is that higher skills have higher wage
rates implying that they have bigger opportunity costs of leisure, whereas lower skills have lower
wage rates implying that they have smaller opportunity costs of leisure. The proposer faces the
tradeoff between maximizing resources extracted from other types and maximizing their incentives
to produce resources available for extraction. In addition, since the proposer cannot observe the
types of other workers and also the other workers have migration freedom, she cannot tax higher
skills that much, otherwise either tax base shrinks or higher skills are induced to mimic lower types
in which she actually needs to pay them information rent to guarantee truth-telling. Since higher
skills are allocated with incomes and consumptions no smaller than those to lower skills, lower
types have incentives to mimic higher types and hence the proposer needs to pay them certain
information rent to prevent them from mimicking. That is, the selfish proposer can just achieve the
second-best allocation scheme. This is why lower skills face negative marginal tax rates.
By using Theorems 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 3.4.3. For any proposer of type k ∈ (w,w), the proposed income schedule given by
(3.13) may have the following discontinuities.
(i) At w = w, we have:
• If U(w) > 0, then there is an upward discontinuity;
• If U(w) = 0, then there is no discontinuity;
• If U(w) < 0, then there is a downward discontinuity.
(ii) At w = k, there is a downward discontinuity.
(iii) At w = w, we have:
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• If U(w) > −wU ′(w), then there is a downward discontinuity;
• If U(w) = −wU ′(w), then there is no discontinuity;
• If U(w) < −wU ′(w), then there is an upward discontinuity.
Proof. See Appendix B.
These discontinuities are graphically shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Graphic Illustration of Proposition 3.4.3
In an economy with an exogenous skill distribution, the tax schedule of [27] and [14] only
exhibits the downward discontinuity at the type of the proposer, as shown in part (ii). In the current
economy with an endogenous skill distribution, we show that there may be another two downward
discontinuities at the lowest type and the highest type. Importantly, we identify the utility of the
lowest skilled as the key variable determining whether or not these two discontinuities are indeed
downward. In order to iron this tax schedule, as shown in Appendix B, it is useful to know when
the SOIC condition is violated at the endpoints of the ex post skill distribution.
3.5 The Voting Equilibrium
Following one common practice in literature, majority rule is used to select the income tax
schedule that shall be implemented. Each worker is assumed to have one vote. As argued by
Roberts [64], if political parties in a democratic system choose the income tax schedule to maxi-
mize the likelihood of being elected then it is somewhat reasonable to view the chosen tax schedule
49
as being determined, albeit indirectly, by a pairwise majority voting process. In each round, work-
ers vote over two arbitrarily-selected alternatives. The one that survives all rounds is hence the
winner.
To distinguish allocation schedules by the types of the proposers who propose them, we let
(c(w, k), y(w, k)) denote the selfishly optimal allocation assigned to a worker of type w by a
proposer of type k. The utility obtained by a worker with skill level w under the schedule proposed
by type k is hence
U(w, k) = c(w, k)− h
(
y(w, k)
w
)
. (3.24)
We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5.1. The selfishly optimal income tax schedule for the median skill type is a Condorcet
winner when pairwise majority voting is restricted to the income tax schedules that are selfishly
optimal for some skill type.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We hence establish the existence of a Condorcet winner in the current political economy. In
particular, as there is a continuum of tax schedules in our problem, the single-crossing condition
used by [65] is not sufficient to prove the existence of a Condorcet winner. Indeed, here we need to
first establish the single-peakedness of preferences and then appeal to Black’s [66] Median Voter
Theorem.
3.6 Identifying the Effect of Migrations on Equilibrium Tax Schedule
3.6.1 Qualitative Characterization
In what follows, we let wm denote the median skill level of the ex ante distribution F (w), and
let w˜m denote that of the ex post distribution Γ(w,w) =
∫ w
w
f˜(t)dt. To identify the effects of
migrations placed on marginal tax rates, we shall compare our marginal tax rates to those of [14]
derived in autarky. As is clear soon, migrations affect marginal tax rates through endogenizing the
skill distribution that is a key part of the tax formula and is the determinant of the median skill
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level. So, migrations affect both the distortion level and the redistribution scale.
We summarize our main findings as two propositions.
Proposition 3.6.1. Suppose
ΘM(w) < θ˜(w) < ΘMR(w) for ∀w ∈ (w,wm]
and
ΘR(w) < θ˜(w) < ΘMR(w) for ∀w ∈ (wm, w)
with these endogenously determined positive bounds ΘM(w), ΘR(w) and ΘMR(w) given in Ap-
pendix B, then we have the following predictions.
(i) If w˜m = wm, then workers of type w ∈ (w,w) face lower tax rates than in autarky.
(ii) If w˜m < wm, then result (i) holds for workers of type w ∈ (w, w˜m] ∪ (wm, w),
whereas workers of type w ∈ (w˜m, wm] face higher tax rates than in autarky.
(iii) If w˜m > wm, then result (i) still holds. In particular, workers of type w ∈
(wm, w˜m] face even lower tax rates than when w˜m = wm.
Proof. See Appendix B and Figure 3.2.7
Intuition: If migration elasticities of high skills are reasonably large, then their migration
threat is strong enough to motivate the government to impose lower tax rates on them relative to
the autarky in which migrations and tax competition are forbidden. Since high types face lower
tax rates and also low types have reasonably large migration elasticities, the incentives for low
types to mimic high types become stronger, which implies that the government needs to transfer
more to them to prevent them from mimicking. This analysis explains why migrations under these
conditions generally induce lower tax rates than suggested by the autarky equilibrium for both
low and high skills. In addition, for types belonging to (w˜m, wm] in case (ii) of Proposition 3.6.1,
7In these figures, yˆR(·) and yˆM (·) denote the maximin and maximax income schedules derived by [14].
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they face higher tax rates than in autarky because the median voter under migrations is poorer.
They belong to the low-income class in autarky while belonging to the high-income class under
migrations, so their status changes from receiving transfers to paying taxes.
Proposition 3.6.2. Suppose

θ˜(w) < ΘM(w) and f(w)Γ(w,w) < f˜(w)F (w) for ∀w ∈ (w,wm],
θ˜(w) < ΘR(w) and f(w)[Γ(w,w)− Γ(w,w)] > f˜(w)[1− F (w)] for ∀w ∈ (wm, w),
(3.25)
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then we have the following predictions.
(i) If w˜m = wm, then workers of type w ∈ (w,w) face higher tax rates than in autarky.
(ii) If w˜m < wm, then result (i) still holds. In particular, workers of type w ∈ (w˜m, wm]
face even higher tax rates than when w˜m = wm.
(iii) If w˜m > wm, then result (i) holds for workers of type w ∈ (w,wm] ∪ (w˜m, w),
whereas workers of type w ∈ (wm, w˜m] face lower tax rates than in autarky.
Proof. See Appendix B and Figure 3.3.
Intuition: Assumption (3.25) provides three conditions: (a) migration elasticity is small for
both low and high skills; (b) the jurisdiction under consideration faces net labor inflow in low
skills but (c) net labor outflow in high skills. Condition (c) means that tax base shrinks relative
to the autarky, so marginal tax rates imposed on remaining high skills must be higher than those
in autarky, which is somehow guaranteed by condition (a). As now high skills face higher tax
rates, low skills have weaker incentives to mimic them, which implies that, everything else equal,
the information rents paid to low skills can be smaller. Also, for the same amount of transfers,
condition (b) implies that each low-skill worker receives less than they may receive in autarky. As
such, both high and low skills face higher marginal tax rates than in autarky. For workers between
ex ante and ex post median skill levels, the reasoning used in analyzing Proposition 3.6.1 still
applies.
We have identified conditions determining the relation between w˜m and wm in Appendix B.
Essentially, these conditions rely on the following four indexes: (1) whether the ex post measure
of workers of all skill levels is greater than, equal to, or smaller than the ex ante one; (2) whether
the net labor inflow of skill levels below the ex ante median skill level is positive or not; (3) whether
the net labor inflow of skill levels above the ex ante median skill level is positive or not; and (4)
the relative magnitude of these two net labor inflows.
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3.6.2 Quantitative Simulation
This subsection proposes numerical simulations of the difference between the current top tax
rate and that derived in autarky. We use parameter values estimated based on the U.S. data. This
exercise allows us to quantitatively measure the effect of migrations on equilibrium tax rates in the
current context of economy. In terms of the equilibrium level of distortion, it also highlights the
joint consideration of majority voting and migration in designing redistributive taxation.
It has been argued by [46] and [55] that Pareto distribution fits the empirical income distribution
at high income levels reasonably well. Assuming un-truncated distributions, namely w =∞, with
ex ante Pareto index a > 1 and ex post Pareto index a˜ > 1, we can thus obtain
1− F (w)
wf(w)
=
1
a
and
Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
=
1
a˜
, (3.26)
which measure, respectively, the ex ante and the ex post degrees of income inequality. By using
U.S. tax return micro data for 2005, Diamond and Saez [29] find that the empirical Pareto coeffi-
cient is approximately a constant around 1.5 for adjusted gross incomes higher than $200,000, we
hence set a˜ = 1.5. Following [45], we assume that h(l) takes the isoelastic form
h(l) = l1+
1
ε /
(
1 +
1
ε
)
(3.27)
for constant elasticity ε > 0. Saez et al. [48] survey the recent literature and conclude that the best
available estimates range from 0.12 to 0.4 in the U.S. As usual, we take a central value of ε = 0.25
for the benchmark exercise. In addition, we, without loss of generality, normalize the upper bound
of l to be 1 and focus on interior values, namely l ∈ (0, 1). Following [1], we set the elasticity of
migration for top-income workers to be θ˜(w) = 0.25.
By applying (3.26) and (3.27), we have the formula of the difference between marginal tax
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rates as
δMTR ≡ τˆR(w)− τR(w) =
1
a
(
1 + 1
ε
)
1 + 1
a
(
1 + 1
ε
) − 1a˜ (1 + 1ε)
1 + 1
a˜
(
1 + 1
ε
) + θ˜(w)ξ(w)
1 + 1
a˜
(
1 + 1
ε
) [1 + l(w) 1ε
w(1 + ε)
]
in which
ξ(w) ≡ ∂U(w)
∂y(w)
y(w)
c(w)
can be interpreted as an approximation of the elasticity of utility with respect to pre-tax income un-
der quasilinear-in-consumption preferences. To make our tax formula generate the current 42.5%
top U.S. marginal tax rate (see [29]), we consider two cases:
• Case (a): a˜ = 1.5, ε = 0.25, θ˜ = 0.25, ξ = 5.96⇒ τR = 42.5%.
• Case (b): a˜ = 1.5, ε = 0.40, θ˜ = 0.25, ξ = 3.64⇒ τR = 42.5%.
We give our findings under varying values of a in Table 3.1. As is obvious, there can be large
differences of marginal tax rates between the current prediction and that in autarky.
Table 3.1: The δMTR (%) under Cases (a) and (b)
a 1.35 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.0 3.0
ε = 0.25 36.2 35.6 34.4 32.1 28.9 20.0
ε = 0.40 29.6 28.9 27.5 24.8 21.1 11.4
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the feature of redistributive taxation when voters are geograph-
ically mobile at the expense of some unobservable migration costs. Without loss of generality, we
consider two jurisdictions that can be interpreted as two local states of the United States or two Eu-
ropean countries. For simplicity, we restrict attention to Nash tax competition between these two
jurisdictions. We have established the voting equilibrium under the majority rule and have fully
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characterized the equilibrium income tax schedule that would enact the wishes of median voters.
The resulting redistributive policy highlights a dynamic interaction between voting-with-hand and
voting-with-feet, which hence makes the level of distortion and redistribution tend to deviate from
that occurs in autarky.
Given what we have established, the goal of this paper is achieved. For future research,
our model can be modified or extended in at least two directions. First, as both quasilinear-in-
consumption and quasilinear-in-labor preferences are used in taxation literature, a parallel analysis
would be conducted under the second type of preferences, and potentially different implications
for redistributive taxation would be worthwhile investigating. Second, instead of being completely
motivated by self-interest, it is natural to expect voters of certain skills to exhibit other-regarding
or pro-social preferences. Incorporating this concern into our model might make the resulting tax
schedule a better approximation to reality.
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have conducted a theoretical analysis with some numerical illustrations to examine re-
distributive labor-income taxation policies. We follow the mechanism design approach, and em-
phasize the features of endogenous outside options facing heterogeneous workers as well as the
endogenous interaction between tax rate and tax base.
The first essay develops a framework to analyze how the interplay of relative consumption con-
cern and income inequality determines optimal redistributive tax policies in an international setting
with two competing countries. We establish and characterize nonlinear labor income tax schedules
that competing Rawlsian governments should implement when workers having private informa-
tion on skills and migration costs decide where to live and how much to work. We consider both
Nash and Stackelberg tax competition, and obtain four main results. First, we establish an optimal
tax formula that generalizes existing ones obtained under maximin social objective and additively
separable preferences. Second, we numerically calculate optimal asymptotic marginal tax rates
under both types of equilibrium and compare them to those obtained in an autarky equilibrium,
finding that the country with large labor inflow implements a much smaller marginal tax rate and
the country with large labor outflow implements a much higher marginal tax rate than suggested by
autarky-equilibrium predictions. Third, for the case with quasilinear-in-consumption preferences
and jealousy-type consumption comparison, we show that the leader country implements a higher
marginal tax rate in Stackelberg equilibrium than that it may implement in Nash equilibrium. And
fourth, we provide a complete characterization on how relativity and inequality together determine
the optimal top-tax rate under both types of tax competition, finding that both the elasticity and
level of migration are determinant for predicting when relativity and inequality are complementary
(or substitutive) in shaping the optimal tax rates placed on top-income workers.
The second essay investigates the feature of redistributive taxation when voters are hetero-
geneous in innate abilities and are geographically mobile at the expense of some unobservable
migration costs. We consider two jurisdictions and restrict attention to Nash tax competition. We
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have established the voting equilibrium under the majority rule and have fully characterized the
equilibrium income tax schedule that would enact the wishes of median voters. The resulting
redistributive policy highlights a dynamic interaction between voting-with-hand and voting-with-
feet, which hence makes the level of distortion and redistribution tend to deviate from that occurs
in autarky. We extend the literature by identifying endogenous and skill-dependent bounds of
migration elasticity based on which we predict that migrations induce lower marginal tax rates
than suggested by an autarky equilibrium if workers’ migration elasticities are bigger than their
respective bound. Also, we depart from the conventional wisdom by predicting for the jurisdic-
tion with net labor inflow in low skills while with net labor outflow in high skills that migrations
induce higher marginal tax rates than suggested by an autarky equilibrium if workers’ migration
elasticities are smaller than their respective bound.
As a final remark of the second essay, we, without resorting to a benevolent social planner and
just assuming that each voter is motivated by self-interest, still obtain an equilibrium tax schedule
that achieves a desirable balance between equity and efficiency. We argue that private information
and foot-voting possibility are key mechanisms leading to this prediction. For low skills, the
median voter (or government) transfers a positive amount of resources to them to induce them to
tell truth in equilibrium and hence minimize the informational rents; for high skills, especially
those with high foot-voting capabilities, the median voter will not tax them that much as compared
to the case in which they cannot migrate in order to restore a desirable tax base for reallocation.
As such, even the median voter benefits the most from this tax schedule, both equity and efficiency
concerns are taken into account seriously under this kind of institutional arrangement. In sum,
it is the “majority-rule democracy” combined with “relevant private information” and “migration
freedom” of heterogeneous voters that lead to a desirable balance between equity and efficiency
among a population of completely self-interested voters.
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APPENDIX A
RELATIVITY, MOBILITY, AND OPTIMAL NONLINEAR INCOME TAXATION IN AN
OPEN ECONOMY
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1: We shall complete the proof in 3 steps.
Step 1. Given the FOC (2.4) of individual choice, the indirect utility of a type-w worker in
country i ∈ {A,B} can be written as
Ui(w) = v(ϕi(Ui(w), li(w), µi, µ−i))− h(li(w)) + ψ(µi, µ−i), (A.1)
where we treat individual consumption ci(w) as an implicit function of Ui(w), li(w), µi, µ−i, and
equivalently rewrite it as ϕi(·). By applying the Implicit Function Theorem, we get from (A.1) that
∂ϕi
∂li
=
h′(li(w))
v′(ci(w))
,
∂ϕi
∂Ui
=
1
v′(ci(w))
,
∂ϕi
∂µi
= −ψi(µi, µ−i)
v′(ci(w))
and
∂ϕi
∂µ−i
= −ψ−i(µi, µ−i)
v′(ci(w))
. (A.2)
Step 2. For expositional purposes, we follow the first-order approach and ignore the SOIC
conditions. After deriving the solutions, then we can verify whether the SOIC conditions are
binding or not. The corresponding Lagrangian is written as follows:
Li({Ui(w), li(w)}w∈[w,w] , µi;λi, γi, {ςi(w)}w∈[w,w])
= Ui(w) + λi
∫ w
w
{
[wli(w)− ϕi(Ui(w), li(w), µi, µ−i)]φi(Ui(w)− U−i(w);w)− R
w − w
}
dw
+
∫ w
w
ςi(w)
[
h′(li(w))
li(w)
w
− U˙i(w)
]
dw
+ γi
[
µi −
∫ w
w
ϕi(Ui(w), li(w), µi, µ−i)fi(w)dw
]
(A.3)
where λi > 0 is the multiplier associated with the binding budget constraint (2.8), ςi(w) is the
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multiplier associated with the FOIC conditions (2.10), and γi is the multiplier associated with the
comparison consumption constraint (2.2). Integrating by parts, we obtain
∫ w
w
ςi(w)U˙i(w)dw = ςi(w)Ui(w)− ςi(w)Ui(w)−
∫ w
w
ς˙i(w)Ui(w)dw. (A.4)
Plugging (A.4) in (A.3) gives rise to
Li({Ui(w), li(w)}w∈[w,w] , µi;λi, γi, {ςi(w)}w∈[w,w])
= Ui(w) + λi
∫ w
w
{
[wli(w)− ϕi(Ui(w), li(w), µi, µ−i)]φi(Ui(w)− U−i(w);w)− R
w − w
}
dw
+ ςi(w)Ui(w)− ςi(w)Ui(w) +
∫ w
w
[
ςi(w)h
′(li(w))
li(w)
w
+ ς˙i(w)Ui(w)
]
dw
+ γi
[
µi −
∫ w
w
ϕi(Ui(w), li(w), µi, µ−i)fi(w)dw
]
.
Assuming that there is no bunching of workers of different skills and the existence of an interior
solution, applying (A.2) shows that the necessary conditions can be written as follows:
∂Li
∂li(w)
= λi
[
w − h
′(li(w))
v′(ci(w))
]
f˜i(w)− γi h
′(li(w))
v′(ci(w))
fi(w)
+
ςi(w)h
′(li(w))
w
[
1 +
li(w)h
′′(li(w))
h′(li(w))
]
= 0 ∀w ∈ [w,w],
(A.5)
∂Li
∂Ui(w)
= − λif˜i(w)
v′(ci(w))
+ λiTi(yi(w))η˜i(w)f˜i(w)
− γifi(w)
v′(ci(w))
+ ς˙i(w) = 0 ∀w ∈ (w,w),
(A.6)
∂Li
∂Ui(w)
= 1 + ςi(w) = 0, (A.7)
∂Li
∂Ui(w)
= −ςi(w) = 0, (A.8)
∂Li
∂µi
= λi
∫ w
w
ψi(µi, µ−i)
v′(ci(w))
f˜i(w)dw + γi
[
1 +
∫ w
w
ψi(µi, µ−i)
v′(ci(w))
fi(w)dw
]
= 0. (A.9)
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Using (A.6), we get
ς˙i(w)
λi
=
γi
λi
fi(w)
v′(ci(w))
+
f˜i(w)
v′(ci(w))
− Ti(yi(w))η˜i(w)f˜i(w).
Integrating on both sides of this equation and using the transversality condition (A.8), we obtain
− ςi(w)
λi
=
γi
λi
∫ w
w
fi(t)
v′(ci(t))
dt+
∫ w
w
[
1
v′(ci(t))
− Ti(yi(t))η˜i(t)
]
f˜i(t)dt. (A.10)
Rearranging (A.5) via using FOC (2.4), we have
T ′i (yi(w))
1− T ′i (yi(w))
=
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
− ςi(w)
λi
v′(ci(w))
wf˜i(w)
[
1 +
li(w)h
′′(li(w))
h′(li(w))
]
∀w ∈ [w,w]. (A.11)
Substituting (A.10) into (A.11) gives the first-order conditions characterizing the optimum marginal
tax rates, with γi/λi determined by solving (A.9).
Step 3. To derive a sufficient condition for the optimal marginal tax profile to satisfy the SOIC
conditions, we rewrite the FOC (2.4) as
v′(ci(w))
h′(yi(w)/w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
=
1
w[1− T ′i (yi(w))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
. (A.12)
Noting that
dLHS
dw
=
v′′(ci(w))c˙i(w)
h′(yi(w)/w)
− v
′(ci(w))h′′(yi(w)/w)[wy˙i(w)− yi(w)]
[wh′(yi(w)/w)]2
and ci(w) = yi(w)− Ti(yi(w))⇒ c˙i(w) = y˙i(w)[1− T ′i (yi(w))], thus
dLHS
dw
< 0 =⇒ y˙i(w) > 0. (A.13)
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Also, noting that
dRHS
dw
= −{w [1− T ′i (yi(w))]}2
[
1− T ′i (yi(w))− w
dT ′i (yi(w))
dw
]
,
we thus arrive at
dT ′i (yi(w))
dw
≤ 0 =⇒ dRHS
dw
< 0. (A.14)
Therefore, (A.12) combined with (A.13) and (A.14) implies that
dT ′i (yi(w))
dw
≤ 0 =⇒ y˙i(w) > 0,
as desired. QED
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1: The Lagrangian of government i’s problem can be expressed as
Li({Ui(w), li(w)}w∈[w,w] , µi;λi, γi)
= Ui(w) + λi
∫ w
w
{
[wli(w)− ϕi(Ui(w), li(w), µi, µ−i)]φi(Ui(w)− U−i(w);w)− R
w − w
}
dw
+ γi
[
µi −
∫ w
w
ϕi(Ui(w), li(w), µi, µ−i)fi(w)dw
]
.
where λi > 0 is the multiplier associated with the binding budget constraint (2.8) and γi is the
multiplier associated with the comparison consumption constraint (2.2). Assuming that there is
no bunching of workers of different skills and the existence of an interior solution, applying (A.2)
gives these necessary conditions:
∂Li
∂Ui(w)
= λi
[
Ti(yi(w))η˜i(w)− 1
v′(ci(w))
]
f˜i(w)− γi fi(w)
v′(ci(w))
= 0 ∀w ∈ (w,w], (A.15)
∂Li
∂li(w)
= λi
(
w − h
′(li(w))
v′(ci(w))
)
f˜i(w)− γih
′(li(w))fi(w)
v′(ci(w))
= 0 ∀w ∈ [w,w], (A.16)
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and
∂Li
∂µi
= λi
∫ w
w
ψi(µi, µ−i)
v′(ci(w))
f˜i(w)dw + γi
[
1 +
∫ w
w
ψi(µi, µ−i)
v′(ci(w))
fi(w)dw
]
= 0. (A.17)
By using (A.15), we obtain the Tiebout-best tax liabilities. By using (A.16) and the FOC (2.4), we
obtain the Tiebout-best marginal tax rates. The ratio γi/λi is determined by (A.17). As is obvious,
the least productive workers receive a transfer determined by the government’s budget constraint.
Therefore, the optimal tax function is discontinuous at w = w. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1: We shall complete the proof in 6 steps.
Step 1. By Assumption 2.2.1, γi/λi > 0 is guaranteed. Given that v(·) is strictly increasing
and h(·) is strictly increasing and convex, for (i) to hold it suffices to show that Ci(w) ≥ 0 for
∀w ∈ (w,w). Therefore, by directly comparing the formulas of marginal tax rates established in
Theorem 2.3.1 and Lemma 2.3.1, claim (i) is immediate.
Step 2. By applying the transversality condition (A.7) to equation (A.11), it is easy to see that
T ′i (yi(w))
1− T ′i (yi(w))
>
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
> 0
under Assumption 2.2.1. Similarly, for a bounded skill distribution with w < ∞, applying the
transversality condition (A.8) to equation (A.11) gives
T ′i (yi(w))
1− T ′i (yi(w))
=
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
> 0
under Assumption 2.2.1. By using Lemma 2.3.1 again, the required assertion (ii) follows.
Step 3. Suppose h(·) takes the isoelastic form, then Ai(w) is a positive constant. Suppose the
first-order approach is valid, namely the SOIC conditions are not binding in the Nash equilibrium,
then we have that v′(·) is strictly deceasing in w as v(·) is assumed to be strictly concave. With
single-peaked skill distributions, 1/wfi(w) always decreases before the mode wm. Beyond the
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mode, it either increases or decreases, depending on how rapidly fi(w) falls with w. A sufficient,
though not necessary, condition for decreasing T ′i (·) over the entire skill distribution is that ag-
gregate skills wfi(w) are non-decreasing beyond the mode wm. Also, noting from term Ci(w)
that
d
dw
∫ w
w
{
1
v′(ci(t))
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(t)
f˜i(t)
]
− Ti(yi(t))η˜i(t)
}
f˜i(t)dt
=
{
Ti(yi(w))− 1
v′(ci(w))η˜i(w)
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]}
η˜i(w)f˜i(w),
hence an application of Lemma 2.3.1 completes the proof of claim (iii).
Step 4. Define
Σi(w) ≡ −ςi(w)
λi
=
γi
λi
∫ w
w
fi(t)
v′(ci(t))
dt+
∫ w
w
[
1
v′(ci(t))
− Ti(yi(t))η˜i(t)
]
f˜i(t)dt,
then the signs of Σi(w) and ςi(w) are opposite. As ςi(w) is differentiable, Σi(w) is differentiable
as well and we have
Σ′i(w) =
{
Ti(yi(w))− 1
v′(ci(w))η˜i(w)
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]}
η˜i(w)f˜i(w) ≡ ξi(w)η˜i(w)f˜i(w),
(A.18)
which implies that Σ′i(w) and ξi(w) have the same sign. Note that
d
dw
{
1
v′(ci(w)η˜i(w))
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]}
= − v
′′(ci(w))c˙i(w)
[v′(ci(w))]2η˜i(w)
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−
˙˜ηi(w)
v′(ci(w))[η˜i(w)]2
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]
+
1
v′(ci(w))η˜i(w)
γi
λi
d[fi(w)/f˜i(w)]
dw︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
under Assumption 2.2.1 and the assumptions that y˙i(w) > 0 and fi(w)/f˜i(w) is non-increasing in
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w, thus the condition −v′′(ci(w))c˙i(w)
v′(ci(w))
≤ ˙˜ηi(w)
η˜i(w)
is sufficient for
d
dw
{
1
v′(ci(w)η˜i(w))
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]}
≤ 0. (A.19)
If we assume that Σi(w) ≥ 0, then we get from the optimal tax formula in Theorem 2.3.1 that
T ′i (yi(w)) > 0. Then applying (A.18) and (A.19) shows that ξ
′
i(w) > 0 given Σi(w) ≥ 0.
Step 5. Assume that there exists a w˜ ∈ (w,w) such that Σi(w˜) ≥ 0. Then we have two cases
to consider in what follows, namely either Σ′i(w˜) ≥ 0 or Σ′i(w˜) < 0. If Σ′i(w˜) ≥ 0, then we have
both ξi(w˜) ≥ 0 and ξ′i(w˜) > 0. So the continuity of ξi(w) with respect to w implies that there is an
open interval with lower bound w˜ such that ξi(·) > 0, and hence Σ′i(·) > 0, on this interval. Σi(·)
is thus positive and strictly increasing on this interval. Without loss of generality, let (w˜, wˆ) be a
maximal interval on which Σ′i(w) > 0 with w˜ < wˆ ≤ w. As a consequence, 0 ≤ Σi(w˜) < Σ(wˆ),
which implies that ξ′i(w) > 0 for ∀w ∈ [w˜, wˆ]. As a result, 0 ≤ ξi(w˜) < ξi(wˆ), which leads us
to Σ′i(wˆ) > 0 by using (A.18). Therefore, Σi(·) is increasing on [w˜, w] given that Σ′i(w˜) ≥ 0. We
know from the transversality condition (A.8) that Σi(w) = −ςi(w)/λi = 0. As we have already
shown that 0 ≤ Σi(w˜) < Σi(w), an immediate contradiction occurs. We, accordingly, claim that
Σ′i(w˜) ≥ 0 does not hold true.
Step 6. Given that we have shown that Σ′i(w˜) < 0 for the chosen w˜, we thus have ξi(w˜) < 0 by
(A.18) and ξ′i(w˜) > 0. Similarly, the continuity of ξi(w) with respect to w implies that there is an
open interval with upper bound w˜ such that ξi(·) < 0, and hence Σ′i(·) < 0, on this interval. Σi(·)
is thus positive and strictly decreasing on this interval. Without loss of generality, let (w∗, w˜) be a
maximal interval on which Σ′i(w) < 0 with w ≤ w∗ < w˜. In consequence, 0 ≤ Σi(w˜) < Σ(w∗),
which implies that ξ′i(w) > 0 for ∀w ∈ [w∗, w˜]. As a result, 0 > ξi(w˜) > ξi(w∗), which leads us
to Σ′i(w
∗) < 0 by using (A.18). Therefore, Σi(·) will not stop decreasing until reaching the lower
bound w, namely Σi(·) will be decreasing on [w, w˜]. We know from the transversality condition
(A.7) that Σi(w) = −ςi(w)/λi > 0. Since we have already shown that 0 ≤ Σi(w˜) < Σi(w), thus
the transversality condition is fulfilled in this case. By using (A.18) and Lemma 2.3.1 again, the
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required assertion (iv) follows. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2: We shall complete the proof in 5 steps.
Step 1. It is easy to verify that γi/λi < 0 under Assumption 2.2.2. Thus, comparing the optimal
tax formulas in Theorem 2.3.1 and Lemma 2.3.1, it is immediate that T ′i (yi(w)) = T
∗′
i (yi(w)) < 0
for w < ∞. Noting from (A.7) that ςi(w) = −1, thus Ai(w)Bi(w)Ci(w) > 0, which implies that
T ′i (yi(w)) > T
∗′
i (yi(w)) by using Lemma 2.3.1 again. The proof of claim (i) is hence complete.
Step 2. Note that
d
dw
{
1
v′(ci(w)η˜i(w))
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]}
= − v
′′(ci(w))c˙i(w)
[v′(ci(w))]2η˜i(w)
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 given Γi(w)≥0
−
˙˜ηi(w)
v′(ci(w))[η˜i(w)]2
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]
+
1
v′(ci(w))η˜i(w)
γi
λi
d[fi(w)/f˜i(w)]
dw︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ Ξi(w)
,
(A.20)
we get by rearranging the terms that
Ξi(w) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Γ˙i(w) ≥ Γi(w)
˙˜ηi(w)
η˜i(w)
. (A.21)
It follows from (A.18) that
ξ′i(w) = T
′
i (yi(w))y˙i(w)−
d
dw
{
1
v′(ci(w)η˜i(w))
[
1 +
γi
λi
fi(w)
f˜i(w)
]}
. (A.22)
We now show that, under Assumption 2.2.2, Σi(w) ≤ 0 implies ξ′i(w) < 0, with Σi(w) defined
in the proof of Proposition 2.3.1. Assume Σi(w) ≤ 0, then we get from the optimal tax formula
established in Theorem 2.3.1 that T ′i (yi(w))y˙i(w) < 0 under Assumption 2.2.2. Therefore, it
follows from (A.20)-(A.22) and the assumption y˙i(w) > 0 under the first-order approach that
ξ′i(w) < 0, as desired.
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Step 3. Here we prove this claim: if there exists a w˜ ∈ [w,w) such that Σi(w˜) ≤ 0 and
Σ′i(w˜) ≤ 0, then Σi(·) is decreasing on the closed interval [w˜, w]. Given these assumptions, then
we have both ξi(w˜) ≤ 0 and ξ′i(w˜) < 0. So the continuity of ξi(w) with respect to w implies
that there is an open interval with lower bound w˜ such that ξi(·) < 0, and hence Σ′i(·) < 0,
on this interval. Σi(·) is thus negative and strictly decreasing on this interval. Without loss of
generality, let (w˜, wˆ) be a maximal interval on which Σ′i(w) < 0 with w˜ < wˆ ≤ w. As a
consequence, Σ(wˆ) < Σi(w˜) ≤ 0, which implies that ξ′i(w) < 0 for ∀w ∈ [w˜, wˆ]. Consequently,
ξi(wˆ) < ξi(w˜) ≤ 0, which leads us to Σ′i(wˆ) < 0 by using (A.18). Therefore, Σi(·) is decreasing
on [w˜, w], as desired.
Step 4. Here we prove another claim: if there exists a w˜ ∈ (w,w] such that Σi(w˜) ≤ 0 and
Σ′i(w˜) ≥ 0, then Σi(·) is increasing on the closed interval [w, w˜]. Given these assumptions, we
thus have ξi(w˜) ≥ 0 by (A.18) and ξ′i(w˜) < 0. Similarly, the continuity of ξi(w) with respect
to w implies that there is an open interval with upper bound w˜ such that ξi(·) > 0, and hence
Σ′i(·) > 0, on this interval. Σi(·) is thus negative and strictly increasing on this interval. Without
loss of generality, let (w∗, w˜) be a maximal interval on which Σ′i(w) > 0 with w ≤ w∗ < w˜. In
consequence, Σ(w∗) < Σi(w˜) ≤ 0, which implies that ξ′i(w) < 0 for ∀w ∈ [w∗, w˜]. Consequently,
0 ≤ ξi(w˜) < ξi(w∗), which leads us to Σ′i(w∗) > 0 by using (A.18). Therefore, Σi(·) will not stop
increasing until reaching the lower bound w, namely Σi(·) will be increasing on [w, w˜], as desired.
Step 5. We now show that Σi(w) > 0, and henceAi(w)Bi(w)Ci(w) > 0, on (w,w). In fact, we
prove this result by means of contradiction. It follows from the transversality condition (A.8) that
Σi(w) = −ςi(w)/λi = 0. If there exists a w˜ ∈ [w,w) such that Σi(w˜) ≤ 0 and Σ′i(w˜) ≤ 0, then
we have proven in Step 3 that Σi(·) is decreasing on the closed interval [w˜, w]. This means that
Σi(w) < Σi(w˜) ≤ 0, yielding an immediate contradiction. Also, it follows from the transversality
condition (A.7) that Σi(w) = −ςi(w)/λi > 0. If there exists a w˜ ∈ (w,w] such that Σi(w˜) ≤ 0
and Σ′i(w˜) ≥ 0, then we have proven in Step 4 that Σi(·) is increasing on the closed interval [w, w˜].
This means that Σi(w) < Σi(w˜) ≤ 0, yielding an immediate contradiction. We can thus conclude
that Σi(w) > 0 for ∀w ∈ (w,w) and also Σ′i(w) > 0 > Σ′i(w). By using Lemma 2.3.1 and (A.18)
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again, then the proof of claim (ii) is complete. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3: It follows from condition (b) that Ai(w) = 1 + ε, a fixed positive
constant. The ex post skill distribution term Bi(w) can be decomposed through
Bi(w) = 1− Fi(w)
wfi(w)
·
F˜i(∞)−F˜i(w)
1−Fi(w)
f˜i(w)/fi(w)
.
By condition (c), we have 1−Fi(w)
wfi(w)
= 1/ai. By L’Hôpital’s rule, we obtain
lim
w↑∞
F˜i(∞)− F˜i(w)
1− Fi(w) = limw↑∞
f˜i(w)
fi(w)
.
As a result, limw↑∞ Bi(w) = 1/ai. By using the definition of the elasticity of migration and
conditions (a) and (c), term Ci(w) can be rewritten as
Ci(w) =
∫∞
w
[
1 + γi
λi
fi(t)
f˜i(t)
− Ti(yi(t))
yi(t)−Ti(yi(t)) θ˜i(t)
]
f˜i(t)dt
F˜i(∞)− F˜i(w)
.
Thus, making use of the L’Hôpital’s rule again shows that
lim
w↑∞
Ci(w) = 1 + γi
λi
αi(∞)− T
′
i (yi(∞))
1− T ′i (yi(∞))
θ˜i(∞).
So, we get from the optimal tax formula derived in Theorem 2.3.1 that
T ′i (yi(∞))
1− T ′i (yi(∞))
=
γi
λi
αi(∞) + (1 + ε) 1
ai
[
1 +
γi
λi
αi(∞)− T
′
i (yi(∞))
1− T ′i (yi(∞))
θ˜i(∞)
]
,
rearranging the algebra of which gives the desired optimal asymptotic tax rate. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.3.4: We shall complete the proof in 3 steps.
Step 1. By applying condition (a) assumed in Proposition 2.3.3 and the assumptionψi(µi, µ−i) =
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σD ∈ (−1, 0) to equation (2.13) produces
γi
λi
=
−σD
1 + σD
F˜i(∞) > 0,
in which it is unnecessary that F˜i(∞) = 1. Also, if Fi(w) = F−i(w), then by using the defini-
tion of f˜i(w) we obtain ∂αi(∞)/∂(1/ai) = 0. Therefore, as long as ∂F˜i(∞)/∂(1/ai) = 0, we
must have ∂
(
γi
λi
αi(∞)
)
/∂(1/ai) = 0. In addition, it follows from the definition of θ˜i(w) that
∂θ˜i(∞)/∂(1/ai) = 0. Finally, it is straightforward that ∂(γi/λi)/∂(−σD) > 0.
Step 2. Using the established formula of T ′i (yi(∞)), we have
∂T ′i (yi(∞))
∂
(
γi
λi
αi(∞)
) = [1 + (1 + ε)(1/ai)]
[
1 + (1 + ε)(1/ai)θ˜i(∞)
]
{
1 + γi
λi
αi(∞) + (1 + ε)(1/ai)
[
1 + γi
λi
αi(∞) + θ˜i(∞)
]}2 ,
by which we hence obtain
∂2T ′i (yi(∞))
∂
(
γi
λi
αi(∞)
)
∂(1/ai)
=
1 + ε{
1 + γi
λi
αi(∞) + (1 + ε)(1/ai)
[
1 + γi
λi
αi(∞) + θ˜i(∞)
]}3
×
([
1 +
γi
λi
αi(∞) + θ˜i(∞)
](
1 +
1 + ε
ai
)[
θ˜i(∞)− 1
]
− θ˜i(∞)
{
1 + θ˜i(∞)
[
1 +
2(1 + ε)
ai
]})
.
Thus if the following condition holds true:
[
1 +
γi
λi
αi(∞) + θ˜i(∞)
] [
θ˜i(∞)− 1
]
≤ 0,
then the cross-partial derivative is negative for any θ˜i(∞) ∈ (0, 1]. It is easy to verify that this
condition holds for θ˜i(∞) ≤ 1 with any σD ∈ (−1, 0), as desired in part (i).
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Step 3. If, however, θ˜i(∞) > 1, then we see that
[
1 +
γi
λi
αi(∞) + θ˜i(∞)
](
1 +
1 + ε
ai
)[
θ˜i(∞)− 1
]
< θ˜i(∞)
{
1 + θ˜i(∞)
[
1 +
2(1 + ε)
ai
]}
is equivalent to
1 +
γi
λi
αi(∞) <
θ˜i(∞)
{
2 + 1+ε
ai
[
1 + θ˜i(∞)
]}
(
1 + 1+ε
ai
) [
θ˜i(∞)− 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
Also, noting that
θ˜i(∞)
{
2 + 1+ε
ai
[
1 + θ˜i(∞)
]}
(
1 + 1+ε
ai
) [
θ˜i(∞)− 1
] − 1 = 1 + θ˜i(∞) + 1+εai
[
1 + θ˜i(∞)2
]
(
1 + 1+ε
ai
) [
θ˜i(∞)− 1
] > 0,
the desired assertion in part (ii) follows. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.3.5: We shall complete the proof in 3 steps.
Step 1. If θ˜i(∞) < 1, then for the two determinant terms of
sgn
 ∂2T ′i (yi(∞))∂ ( γi
λi
αi(∞)
)
∂(1/ai)

established in Step 2 of Proposition 2.3.4 we see the following facts: for the first term we have
1 +
γi
λi
αi(∞) + (1 + ε)(1/ai)
[
1 +
γi
λi
αi(∞) + θ˜i(∞)
]
> 0
is equivalent to
αi(∞) <
(
−λi
γi
) 1 + 1+ε
ai
[
1 + θ˜i(∞)
]
1 + 1+ε
ai︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
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and also for the second term we have
[
1 +
γi
λi
αi(∞) + θ˜i(∞)
](
1 +
1 + ε
ai
)[
θ˜i(∞)− 1
]
> θ˜i(∞)
{
1 + θ˜i(∞)
[
1 +
2(1 + ε)
ai
]}
is equivalent to
αi(∞) >
(
−λi
γi
) 1 + θ˜i(∞) + 1+εai [1 + θ˜i(∞)2](
1 + 1+ε
ai
) [
1− θ˜i(∞)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
Noting that
1 + 1+ε
ai
[
1 + θ˜i(∞)
]
1 + 1+ε
ai
>
1 + θ˜i(∞) + 1+εai
[
1 + θ˜i(∞)2
]
(
1 + 1+ε
ai
) [
1− θ˜i(∞)
]
is equivalent to
0 > 2θ˜i(∞)
(
1 +
1 + ε
ai
)[
1 +
1 + ε
ai
θ˜i(∞)
]
,
which however is an immediate contradiction, so we must have
1 + 1+ε
ai
[
1 + θ˜i(∞)
]
1 + 1+ε
ai
<
1 + θ˜i(∞) + 1+εai
[
1 + θ˜i(∞)2
]
(
1 + 1+ε
ai
) [
1− θ˜i(∞)
] ,
by which and the facts that γi/λi < 0 for σD ∈ (0, 1) and ∂(γi/λi)/∂σD < 0 the desired assertion
in part (i) follows.
Step 2. If θ˜i(∞) = 1, then we get from Step 2 of Proposition 2.3.4 that
∂2T ′i (yi(∞))
∂
(
γi
λi
αi(∞)
)
∂(1/ai)
=
−2(1 + ε)
(
1 + 1+ε
ai
)
{
1 + γi
λi
αi(∞) + (1 + ε)(1/ai)
[
2 + γi
λi
αi(∞)
]}3 .
Also, since we have that
1 +
γi
λi
αi(∞) + (1 + ε)(1/ai)
[
2 +
γi
λi
αi(∞)
]
> 0
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is equivalent to
αi(∞) <
(
−λi
γi
)
1 + 21+ε
ai
1 + 1+ε
ai︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
the required assertion in part (ii) immediately follows.
Step 3. If θ˜i(∞) > 1, then for the second term determining
sgn
 ∂2T ′i (yi(∞))∂ ( γi
λi
αi(∞)
)
∂(1/ai)

we have that
[
1 +
γi
λi
αi(∞) + θ˜i(∞)
](
1 +
1 + ε
ai
)[
θ˜i(∞)− 1
]
> θ˜i(∞)
{
1 + θ˜i(∞)
[
1 +
2(1 + ε)
ai
]}
is equivalent to
αi(∞) <
(
−λi
γi
) 1 + θ˜i(∞) + 1+εai [1 + θ˜i(∞)2](
1 + 1+ε
ai
) [
1− θ˜i(∞)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
,
which however is an immediate contradiction. As a result, we must have
[
1 +
γi
λi
αi(∞) + θ˜i(∞)
](
1 +
1 + ε
ai
)[
θ˜i(∞)− 1
]
< θ˜i(∞)
{
1 + θ˜i(∞)
[
1 +
2(1 + ε)
ai
]}
.
Thus, using the first determinant term 1 + γi
λi
αi(∞) + (1 + ε)(1/ai)
[
1 + γi
λi
αi(∞) + θ˜i(∞)
]
, the
required assertion in part (iii) follows. QED
Proof of Theorem 2.4.1: As usual, we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium by using backward
induction. Thus, the Lagrangian of the follower country −i is the same as in the case when these
two countries play Nash, while the Lagrangian for the leader country i is different and reads as
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follows:
Li({Ui(w), li(w)}w∈[w,w] , µi;λi, γi, {ςi(w)}w∈[w,w])
= Ui(w) + λi
∫ w
w
{
[wli(w)− ϕi(Ui(w), li(w), µi, µ−i(µi))]φi(Ui(w)− U−i(w);w)− R
w − w
}
dw
+ ςi(w)Ui(w)− ςi(w)Ui(w) +
∫ w
w
[
ςi(w)h
′(li(w))
li(w)
w
+ ς˙i(w)Ui(w)
]
dw
+ γi
[
µi −
∫ w
w
ϕi(Ui(w), li(w), µi, µ−i(µi))fi(w)dw
]
.
Note that
µ−i =
∫ w
w
ϕ−i(U−i(w), l−i(w), µ−i, µi)f−i(w)dw,
making use of the Implicit Function Theorem produces
∂µ−i
∂µi
=
∫ w
w
∂ϕ−i
∂µi
f−i(w)dw
1− ∫ w
w
∂ϕ−i
∂µ−i
f−i(w)dw
. (A.23)
Assuming that there is no bunching of workers of different skills and the existence of an interior
solution, then all of these first-order necessary conditions of Lagrangian Li are the same as those
in the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 but
∂Li
∂µi
= − λi
∫ w
w
(
∂ϕi
∂µi
+
∂ϕi
∂µ−i
∂µ−i
∂µi
)
f˜i(w)dw
+ γi
[
1−
∫ w
w
(
∂ϕi
∂µi
+
∂ϕi
∂µ−i
∂µ−i
∂µi
)
fi(w)dw
]
= 0,
where ∂µ−i/∂µi is given by equation (A.23). QED
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1: Applying condition (a) and (A.2) to equation (A.23) shows that
∂µ−i
∂µi
=
−σF
1 + σD
,
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substituting which into the formula of γi/λi shown in Theorem 2.4.1 reveals that
γi
λi
=
σ2F − (1 + σD)σD
(1 + σD)2 − σ2F
F˜i(w).
We thus obtain
∂(γi/λi)
∂σD
= − σ
2
F + (1 + σD)
2
[(1 + σD)2 − σ2F ]2
F˜i(w) < 0
and
∂(γi/λi)
∂σ2F
=
1 + σD
[(1 + σD)2 − σ2F ]2
F˜i(w) > 0.
As a result, using chain rule, Corollary 2.4.1 and Proposition 2.3.3 gives rise to
∂2T ′i (yi(∞))
∂σD∂(1/ai)
=
∂2T ′i (yi(∞))
∂
(
γi
λi
αi(∞)
)
∂(1/ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· αi(∞)∂(γi/λi)
∂σD︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
and
∂2T ′i (yi(∞))
∂σ2F∂(1/ai)
=
∂2T ′i (yi(∞))
∂
(
γi
λi
αi(∞)
)
∂(1/ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· αi(∞)∂(γi/λi)
∂σ2F︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0
for ∀σD ∈ (−1, 0) and θ˜i(∞) < 1, as desired. For the other cases, we can similarly show that the
predictions of Nash equilibrium carry over to the current Stackelberg equilibrium. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2: It follows from Theorem 2.4.1 that
∂(γi/λi)
∂(∂µ−i/∂µi)
=
Λ[
1− ∫ w
w
(
∂ci(w)
∂µi
+ ∂ci(w)
∂µ−i
∂µ−i
∂µi
)
fi(w)dw
]2
where
Λ ≡
[
1−
∫ w
w
∂ci(w)
∂µi
fi(w)dw
] ∫ w
w
∂ci(w)
∂µ−i
f˜i(w)dw+
∫ w
w
∂ci(w)
∂µ−i
fi(w)dw
∫ w
w
∂ci(w)
∂µi
f˜i(w)dw.
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If Assumption 2.2.1 holds, then Λ > 0, and hence
∂(γi/λi)
∂(∂µ−i/∂µi)
> 0.
Also, using Theorem 2.4.1 and Assumption 2.2.1 again gives rise to ∂µ−i/∂µi > 0. Since we get
from the optimal tax formula in Theorem 2.3.1 that optimal marginal tax rates strictly increase in
γi/λi and ∂µ−i/∂µi = 0 in the Nash equilibrium, the required assertion accordingly follows. QED
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APPENDIX B
VOTING OVER SELFISHLY OPTIMAL INCOME TAX SCHEDULES WITH TAX-DRIVEN
MIGRATIONS
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1: We shall complete the proof in 4 steps.
Step 1. In order to solve problem (3.12), we first give the following lemma.
Lemma B.1.1. The optimal schedule of before-tax incomes y(·) for type k’s problem (3.12) is
obtained by solving the following unconstrained maximization problem
max
y(·)
1
Γ(w,w)
∫ w
w
{[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w)− y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
Γ(w,w)
}
dw
+
∫ k
w
y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
dw
(B.1)
with Γ(w,w) ≡ ∫ w
w
f˜(t)dt ≥ 0.
Proof. By using (3.6), we have
U(w) = U(w) +
∫ w
w
y(t)
t2
h′
(
y(t)
t
)
dt. (B.2)
Integrating over the ex post support of the skill distribution yields
∫ w
w
U(w)f˜(w)dw = U(w)
∫ w
w
f˜(w)dw +
∫ w
w
[∫ w
w
y(t)
t2
h′
(
y(t)
t
)
dt
]
f˜(w)dw. (B.3)
Reversing the order of integration in (B.3) gives rise to
∫ w
w
U(w)f˜(w)dw = U(w)
∫ w
w
f˜(w)dw +
∫ w
w
y(t)
t2
h′
(
y(t)
t
)[∫ w
t
f˜(w)dw
]
dt. (B.4)
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Also, it follows from (3.5) that
∫ w
w
U(w)f˜(w)dw =
∫ w
w
c(w)f˜(w)dw −
∫ w
w
h
(
y(w)
w
)
f˜(w)dw. (B.5)
Applying the equality form of (3.10) to (B.5) shows that
∫ w
w
U(w)f˜(w)dw =
∫ w
w
y(w)f˜(w)dw −
∫ w
w
h
(
y(w)
w
)
f˜(w)dw. (B.6)
Combining (B.4) and (B.6) leads us to
U(w)
∫ w
w
f˜(w)dw =
∫ w
w
y(w)f˜(w)dw
−
∫ w
w
h
(
y(w)
w
)
f˜(w)dw −
∫ w
w
y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)[∫ w
w
f˜(t)dt
]
dw.
(B.7)
Define
Γ(w,w) ≡
∫ w
w
f˜(t)dt, (B.8)
then we can rewrite (B.7) as
U(w) =
1
Γ(w,w)
∫ w
w
{[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w)− y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
Γ(w,w)
}
dw. (B.9)
Substituting (B.9) into (B.2) and setting w = k, then the maximand in (B.1) is established.
Step 2. We prove the following lemma.
Lemma B.1.2. By setting k = w in problem (B.1), the maximin income schedule, denoted by
{
yR(w),
{
yR(w)
}
w∈(w,w) , y
R(w)
}
,
is obtained as follows.
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(i)
{
yR(w)
}
w∈(w,w) and y
R(w) are solutions to equations
[
1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w) +
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
=
[
1
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w3
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ(w,w)
(B.10)
and
[
1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w) +
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
− U(w)
]
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
= 0, (B.11)
respectively, in which
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
=

g−(∆(w)|w)f−(w)n− ∂U(w)∂y(w) for ∆(w) ≥ 0,
g(−∆(w)|w)f(w)∂U(w)
∂y(w)
for ∆(w) ≤ 0
(B.12)
with
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
=
1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w2
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)
(B.13)
for ∀w ∈ (w,w].
(ii) Given the established
{
yR(w)
}
w∈(w,w) and y
R(w), yR(w) is obtained by solving
the balanced government budget constraint.
Proof. By setting k = w, the maximand of problem (B.1) is hence given by (B.9). It is
straightforward that the corresponding maximization problem can be solved point-wise, and we
just need to consider two cases.
Case I: w ∈ (w,w). To solve the first-order condition ∂U(w)/∂y(w) = 0 using (B.9), it is
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sufficient to solve the equation
[
1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w) +
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
− y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
=
[
1
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w3
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ(w,w).
(B.14)
By applying the formula of integration by parts to (B.8), we have
Γ(w,w) = f˜(w)w − f˜(w)w −
∫ w
w
f˜ ′(t)tdt,
by which we obtain
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
= −w∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
and
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
= w
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
. (B.15)
Applying (B.15) to (B.14) and rearranging the algebra, the desired (B.10) is hence established. By
setting k = w in the maximand of problem (B.1), then for ∀w ∈ (w,w) (B.13) is immediate by
applying the formula of integration by parts. Also, by using (3.8), (B.12) is immediate.
Case II: w = w. By using (B.9) and the formula of integration by parts again, we have the
following first-order condition:
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
=− U(w)
Γ(w,w)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
+
w
Γ(w,w)
{[
1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w) +
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
}
= 0.
(B.16)
By applying (B.15) to (B.16) and rearranging the algebra, equation (B.11) is thus obtained. In
addition, by setting k = w in the maximand of problem (B.1) and making use of the formula of
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integration by parts, we obtain
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
=− U(w)
Γ(w,w)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
+
w
Γ(w,w)
{[
1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w) +
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
}
+ w
[
1
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w3
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
.
(B.17)
By applying (B.16) to (B.17), then we arrive at that (B.13) also holds for w = w.
Step 3. We also need the following lemma.
Lemma B.1.3. By setting k = w in problem (B.1), the maximax income schedule, denoted by
{
yM(w),
{
yM(w)
}
w∈(w,w) , y
M(w)
}
,
is obtained as follows.
(i)
{
yM(w)
}
w∈(w,w) and y
M(w) are solutions to equations
[
1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w) +
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
=
[
1
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w3
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
[Γ(w,w)− Γ(w,w)]
(B.18)
and
[
1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w)+
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
− U(w)
]
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
= 0,
(B.19)
respectively, in which ∂f˜(w)/∂y(w) is determined by equations (B.12) and (B.13)
for ∀w ∈ [w,w).
(ii) Given the established
{
yM(w)
}
w∈(w,w) and y
M(w), yM(w) is obtained by solving
the balanced government budget constraint.
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Proof. By setting k = w, the maximand of problem (B.1) can be written as
U(w) =
1
Γ(w,w)
∫ w
w
{[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w)− y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
Γ(w,w)
}
dw
+
∫ w
w
y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
dw.
(B.20)
The corresponding maximization problem can be solved point-wise, and we just need to consider
two cases.
Case I: w ∈ (w,w). To solve the first-order condition ∂U(w)/∂y(w) = 0 using (B.20), it is
sufficient to solve the equation
[
1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w) +
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
− y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
=
[
1
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w3
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
[Γ(w,w)− Γ(w,w)].
(B.21)
By using (B.15) and rearranging the algebra, (B.18) follows from (B.21). Similar to the proof of
Lemma B.1.2, it is easy to verify that
{
∂f˜(w)/∂y(w)
}
w∈(w,w)
is determined by equations (B.12)
and (B.13).
Case II: w = w. By using (B.20) and the formula of integration by parts, we have the first-order
condition:
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
=− U(w)
Γ(w,w)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
− w
Γ(w,w)
{[
1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w) +
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
}
+
w
Γ(w,w)
{[
1
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w3
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ(w,w) +
y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
}
− w
[
1
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w3
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
= 0.
(B.22)
By applying (B.15) and rearranging the algebra, (B.22) can be simplified as being the desired
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(B.19). In order to solve for the term ∂f˜(w)/∂y(w) appearing in (B.22), we get from (B.9) that
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
=− U(w)
Γ(w,w)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
+ w
[
1
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w3
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
− w
Γ(w,w)
{[
1− 1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w) +
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
}
+
w
Γ(w,w)
y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
.
(B.23)
Applying (B.22) to (B.23) results in the desired equation (B.13) for w = w.
Step 4. By using the maximization problem (B.1) stated in Lemma B.1.1, it is easy to show that
∂U(k)
∂y(w)
=
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
for ∀w ∈ [w, k)
and
∂U(k)
∂y(w)
=
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
for ∀w ∈ (k, w],
for ∀k ∈ (w,w). Therefore, the desired income schedule (3.13) follows from a direct application
of Lemmas B.1.2 and B.1.3. QED
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1: We shall complete the proof in 3 steps.
Step 1. Making use of (3.2) and (3.5) reveals that
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
− U(w) = TM(y(w)). (B.24)
Plugging (B.24) in (3.15) produces
τM(w) = −∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[
TM(y(w)) +
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
, (B.25)
in which we have used (B.12), (B.13) and the strict convexity of h. Also, by applying (3.6), (B.25)
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can be equivalently written as
τM(w) = −∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)
[
TM(y(w)) + wU ′(w)
]
. (B.26)
So, the required assertion (3.19) follows from (B.25) and (B.26).
Step 2. In fact, we can further rewrite (B.25) as
τM(w) = −∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
y(w)
f˜(w)
[
TM(y(w))
y(w)
+
1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
= − ∂f˜(w)
∂U(w)
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
y(w)
f˜(w)
[
TM(y(w))
y(w)
+
1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
= − ∂f˜(w)
∂∆(w)
c(w)
f˜(w)
· ∂U(w)
∂y(w)
· y(w)
c(w)
[
TM(y(w))
y(w)
+
1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
= −θ˜(w) ·MUy(w) · Qy,c(w)
[
ATRM(w) +
1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
,
(B.27)
in which we have used the chain rule of calculus, (3.8) and (3.9). Applying (3.4) to (B.27) reveals
that
τM(w) = −θ˜(w) ·MUy(w) · Qy,c(w)
[
ATRM(w) + 1− τM(w)] ,
rearranging the algebra of which results in
τM(w) = − θ˜(w) ·MUy(w) · Qy,c(w)
1− θ˜(w) ·MUy(w) · Qy,c(w)
[
ATRM(w) + 1
]
(B.28)
whenever θ˜(w) ·MUy(w) · Qy,c(w) 6= 1. As a result, assertions (3.20) and (3.21) are obtained by
using (B.28).
Step 3. We get from Lemma B.1.1 that
Γ(w,w)− Γ(w,w) = −
∫ w
w
f˜(t)dt = −Γ(w,w) < 0, ∀w > w. (B.29)
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Also, we can show that
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
≥ 0
⇔ w ≥ h(l(w))
l(w)
[
1− l(w)h
′(l(w))
h(l(w))
]
.
(B.30)
Let’s defineH(l) ≡ lh′(l)−h(l). We haveH ′(l) = lh′′(l) > 0 for ∀l > 0, which implies thatH(l)
is strictly increasing in l and hence H(l) > H(0) = 0. In other words, lh′(l)/h(l) > 1, and hence
the right hand side of the second inequality of (B.30) is negative. Given that w > 0 by assumption,
we conclude by using (B.30) again that
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
> 0. (B.31)
So combining (3.16), (B.29), (B.31), (B.12), (B.13) and the strict convexity of h all together gives
rise to the desired assertion (ii). QED
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2: We shall complete the proof in 2 steps.
Step 1. By using the chain rule of calculus, (3.8) and (3.9), we have
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)
[
h
(
y(w)
w
)
− y(w)− y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
=
∂f˜(w)
∂∆(w)
c(w)
f˜(w)
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
1
c(w)
[
h
(
y(w)
w
)
− y(w)− y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
= θ˜(w)
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
1
c(w)
[
h
(
y(w)
w
)
− y(w)− y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
.
(B.32)
Then we get from (B.31), (B.32) and (3.17) that
τR(w) =
∂U(w)
∂y(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0

Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− θ˜(w)
c(w)
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 , (B.33)
90
by which assertion (3.22) is immediate.
Step 2. It follows from (3.6) that U(w) > U(w). Making use (3.2) and (3.5) shows that
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
− U(w) = TR(y(w)) + U(w)− U(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
by which the desired assertion (3.23) follows. QED
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3: We shall complete the proof in 3 steps.
Step 1. As w approaches w from the above, we get from (3.16) that
τM(w) = −∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
, (B.34)
in which we have used the continuity of τM(w) over the interval (w, k). Comparing this formula
(B.34) with (3.15) reveals that
τM(w)− τM(w) = ∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· U(w).
So, for example, if U(w) > 0, then we have τM(w) > τM(w). We have three cases to consider.
First, if τM(w) ≥ 0 > τM(w), then under tax τM(w) each type-w worker has her income distorted
upward compared to the full-information solution, whereas her income is either not distorted or is
distorted downward compared to the full-information solution under tax τM(w). And the similar
observation applies for the case τM(w) > 0 ≥ τM(w). Second, if τM(w) > τM(w) > 0, then
each type-w worker has her income distorted downward compared to the full-information solution
under both taxes but the magnitude of distortion is bigger under tax τM(w). And the similar
observation applies for the case τM(w) > τM(w) ≥ 0. Third, if 0 > τM(w) > τM(w), then each
type-w worker has her income distorted upward compared to the full-information solution under
both taxes but the magnitude of distortion is bigger under tax τM(w). And the similar observation
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applies for the case 0 ≥ τM(w) > τM(w). Thus, no matter which case we consider, we see an
upward discontinuity of the income schedule whenever τM(w) > τM(w). For the other cases,
we can analyze in a quite similar way, and we omit them to economize on the space. The desired
assertion in (i) hence follows.
Step 2. It follows from (3.16) and (3.17) that
τM(w)− τR(w) = −Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
[
1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w2
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
< 0,
then we can apply the same reasoning used in step 1 to obtain the assertion stated in (ii).
Step 3. As w approaches w from the below, we get from (3.17) that
τR(w) = −∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
, (B.35)
in which we have used the continuity of τR(w) over the interval (k, w). Comparing this formula
(B.35) with (3.18) reveals that
τR(w)− τR(w) = −∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+ U(w)
]
,
which combined with (3.6) and the same reasoning used in step 1 leads us to the desired assertion
shown in part (iii). QED
Proof of Theorem 3.5.1: We shall complete the proof in 3 steps.
Step 1. Let’s consider two alternative proposers of types k1 and k2, for k1 < k2. Since their
proposed income schedules coincide with the maximax schedule for types below their type and
coincide with the maximin schedule for types above their type, and also the maximax income
schedule lies everywhere above the maximin income schedule, the higher the type of the proposer,
the more workers whose types are below the proposer and the more workers who are allocated with
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the maximax incomes. Precisely, if the proposer changes from type k1 to type k2, all workers of
types belong to set [k1, k2] are strictly better off in terms of pre-tax income while all other workers
with the remaining types are neutral to this change. We hence have that y(w, k1) ≤ y(w, k2) for
∀w, k1, k2 ∈ [w,w], and y(w, k1) < y(w, k2) for ∀w ∈ [k1, k2].
In addition, as all proposers face the same government budget and incentive constraints, each
proposer must weakly prefer what she obtains with her own schedule to what any other worker
proposer for her. Formally,
U(w,w) ≥ U(w, k) for ∀w, k ∈ [w,w]. (B.36)
We next show that a worker of any type w has a weakly single-peaked preference on the set of
types. To this end, we need to consider two cases with the proof procedure being directly brought
from [14].
Step 2. First, we consider the right hand side of w. That is, let’s pick arbitrarily three types
w, k1, k2 satisfying w < k1 < k2.
By using (3.6) and (B.36), we have
U(w, k1) = U(k1, k1)−
∫ k1
w
h′
(
y(t, k1)
t
)
y(t, k1)
t2
dt
≥ U(k1, k2)−
∫ k1
w
h′
(
y(t, k1)
t
)
y(t, k1)
t2
dt.
(B.37)
Similarly, we can get by (3.6) that
U(w, k2) = U(k1, k2)−
∫ k1
w
h′
(
y(t, k2)
t
)
y(t, k2)
t2
dt. (B.38)
Solving for U(k1, k2) from (B.38) and inserting it into (B.37) produces
U(w, k1)− U(w, k2) ≥
∫ k1
w
[
h′
(
y(t, k2)
t
)
y(t, k2)
t2
− h′
(
y(t, k1)
t
)
y(t, k1)
t2
]
dt. (B.39)
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Since h is strictly increasing and convex, we hence have by using (B.39) that U(w, k1) ≥ U(w, k2),
which combined with (B.36) reveals that
U(w,w) ≥ U(w, k1) ≥ U(w, k2), ∀w < k1 < k2. (B.40)
Step 3. Second, for the case with w > k1 > k2, we also get by using (3.6) and (B.36) that
U(w, k1) = U(k1, k1) +
∫ w
k1
h′
(
y(t, k1)
t
)
y(t, k1)
t2
dt
≥ U(k1, k2) +
∫ w
k1
h′
(
y(t, k1)
t
)
y(t, k1)
t2
dt.
(B.41)
Similarly,
U(w, k2) = U(k1, k2) +
∫ w
k1
h′
(
y(t, k2)
t
)
y(t, k2)
t2
dt. (B.42)
Making use of (B.41) and (B.42) gives rise to
U(w, k1)− U(w, k2) ≥
∫ w
k1
[
h′
(
y(t, k1)
t
)
y(t, k1)
t2
− h′
(
y(t, k2)
t
)
y(t, k2)
t2
]
dt. (B.43)
By applying the same reasoning used in step 2 to (B.43), we arrive at
U(w,w) ≥ U(w, k1) ≥ U(w, k2), ∀w > k1 > k2. (B.44)
Accordingly, (B.40) combined with (B.44) reveals that the preference of any given type of worker
is indeed (weakly) single-peaked on the set of types. By applying the Black’s Median Voter Theo-
rem (see [66]), the desired assertion hence follows. QED
Proof of Propositions 3.6.1 and 3.6.2: To prove these two propositions, we just need to prove
the following lemma.
Lemma B.1.4. Suppose w˜m = wm, then we have the following predictions.
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(i) We have τR(w) > τˆM(w) > τM(w) if ΘM(w) < θ˜(w) < ΘMR(w) and τˆR(w) >
τR(w) > τˆM(w) if ΘR(w) < θ˜(w) < ΘMR(w), in which τˆM(w) and τˆR(w)
denote the maximax and maximin marginal tax rates derived by [14] and ΘM(w),
ΘR(w) and ΘMR(w) are respectively given by (B.53), (B.56) and (B.59).
(ii) If the ex ante and ex post skill distributions satisfy

f(w)
F (w)
< f˜(w)
Γ(w,w)
for ∀w ∈ (w,wm],
f(w)
1−F (w) >
f˜(w)
Γ(w,w)−Γ(w,w) for ∀w ∈ (wm, w),
(B.45)
then τˆM(w) < τM(w) < τˆR(w) if θ˜(w) < ΘM(w) and τM(w) < τˆR(w) <
τR(w) if θ˜(w) < ΘR(w).
We shall complete the proof this lemma in 5 steps.
Step 1. The tax formulas of [14] are given as follows:
τˆR(w) =
1− F (w)
wf(w)
[
1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w2
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
, (B.46)
τˆM(w) = − F (w)
wf(w)
[
1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w2
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
. (B.47)
By using our notation given by (B.13), (B.46) and (B.47) can be rewritten as
τˆR(w) =
1− F (w)
wf(w)
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
, (B.48)
τˆM(w) = − F (w)
wf(w)
∂U(w)
∂y(w)
. (B.49)
Step 2. We can use (B.29) to rewrite (3.16) as
τM(w) =
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
1
f˜(w)
[
h
(
y(w)
w
)
− y(w)− y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
− Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
[
1
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w2
h′′
(
y(w)
w
)]
.
(B.50)
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Substituting (B.32) into (B.50) and using (B.13) and (B.31), we can rewrite τM(w) as
τM(w) =
∂U(w)
∂y(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0

θ˜(w)
c(w)
[
h
(
y(w)
w
)
− y(w)− y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 . (B.51)
By using (B.49) and (B.51), we obtain
τˆM(w)− τM(w)
=
∂U(w)
∂y(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
{
θ˜(w)
c(w)
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
−
[
F (w)
wf(w)
− Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
]}
(B.52)
for ∀w ∈ (w,wm]. We first define by using (B.52) that
ΘM(w) ≡ c(w)
wl(w)− h(l(w)) + l(w)h′(l(w))
[
F (w)
wf(w)
− Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
]
. (B.53)
So using (B.52) and (B.53) gives rise to
τˆM(w)

< τM(w) if θ˜(w) < ΘM(w),
= τM(w) if θ˜(w) = ΘM(w),
> τM(w) if θ˜(w) > ΘM(w).
(B.54)
Since by definition we have θ˜(w) > 0, hence τˆM(w) ≤ τM(w) predicted by (B.54) additionally
requires that
Γ(w,w)
f˜(w)
<
F (w)
f(w)
,
as desired by (B.45).
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Step 3. By using (B.48) and (B.33), we obtain
τˆR(w)− τR(w)
=
∂U(w)
∂y(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
{
θ˜(w)
c(w)
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
−
[
Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
− 1− F (w)
wf(w)
]}
(B.55)
for ∀w ∈ (wm, w). We first define by using (B.55) that
ΘR(w) ≡ c(w)
wl(w)− h(l(w)) + l(w)h′(l(w))
[
Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
− 1− F (w)
wf(w)
]
. (B.56)
Using (B.55) and (B.56) gives rise to
τˆR(w)

< τR(w) if θ˜(w) < ΘR(w),
= τR(w) if θ˜(w) = ΘR(w),
> τR(w) if θ˜(w) > ΘR(w).
(B.57)
Since by definition we have θ˜(w) > 0, hence τˆR(w) ≤ τR(w) predicted by (B.57) additionally
requires that
Γ(w,w)
f˜(w)
>
1− F (w)
f(w)
,
as desired by (B.45).
Step 4. Applying (B.49) and (B.33) reveals that
τˆM(w)− τR(w)
= −∂U(w)
∂y(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0

Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
+
F (w)
wf(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− θ˜(w)
c(w)
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)
+
y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
(B.58)
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for ∀w ∈ (wm, w). We first define by using (B.58) that
ΘMR(w) ≡ c(w)
wl(w)− h(l(w)) + l(w)h′(l(w))
[
Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
+
F (w)
wf(w)
]
. (B.59)
Thus, using (B.58) and (B.59) gives rise to
τˆM(w)

< τR(w) if θ˜(w) < ΘMR(w),
= τR(w) if θ˜(w) = ΘMR(w),
> τR(w) if θ˜(w) > ΘMR(w).
(B.60)
Step 5. Applying (B.48) and (B.51) reveals that
τˆR(w)− τM(w)
=
∂U(w)
∂y(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0

Γ(w,w)
wf˜(w)
+
1− F (w)
wf(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− θ˜(w)
c(w)
[
h
(
y(w)
w
)
− y(w)− y(w)
w
h′
(
y(w)
w
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0

(B.61)
for ∀w ∈ (w,wm]. Then, it is straightforward by (B.61) that τˆR(w) > τM(w). Finally, it
is easy to verify by using equations (B.53), (B.56) and (B.59) that ΘM(w) < ΘMR(w) and
ΘR(w) < ΘMR(w) for ∀w ∈ (w,w), as desired in part (i) of Lemma B.1.4. QED
B.2 The Complete Solution of Tax Design
Following [27] and [14], if either the maximin or the maximax income schedule obtained using
the first-order approach fails to satisfy the SOIC condition (3.7), then it is necessary to bunch all
types in a decreasing part of the schedule with some types who are in an increasing part. This kind
of surgery is known as ironing, and any bunching region must be a closed interval.
Correspondingly, we let yM∗(w), yM∗(·), yR∗(·) and yM∗(w) denote the optimal maximax and
maximin income schedules when the SOIC condition has been taken into account. We now show
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that it is optimal for the proposer of type k to build some bridges, one of which includes her own
type between the maximax and maximin parts of this schedule.
Theorem B.2.1. For any proposer of type k ∈ (w,w), the selfishly optimal schedule of pre-tax
incomes, denoted by y∗(·), is given as follows.
(i) If U(w) ∈ (−wU ′(w), 0), then
y∗(w) =

yM∗(w) for w ∈ [w,wη] if wη ≤ wα,
yM∗(w) for w ∈ (wη, wα),
yM∗(wα) for w ∈ [wα, wβ] if wα > w,
yR∗(wβ) for w ∈ [wα, wβ] if wβ < w,
yR∗(w) for w ∈ (wβ, wγ),
yR∗(w) for w ∈ [wγ, w] if wγ ≥ wβ,
(B.62)
for some wη, wα, wβ, wγ ∈ (w,w) with wα < wβ and k ∈ [wα, wβ].
(ii) If U(w) ≥ 0, then
y∗(w) =

yM∗(w) for w = w,
yM∗(w) for w ∈ (w,wα),
yM∗(wα) for w ∈ [wα, wβ] if wα > w,
yR∗(wβ) for w ∈ [wα, wβ] if wβ < w,
yR∗(w) for w ∈ (wβ, wγ),
yR∗(w) for w ∈ [wγ, w] if wγ ≥ wβ,
(B.63)
for some wα, wβ, wγ ∈ (w,w) with wα < wβ and k ∈ [wα, wβ].
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(iii) If U(w) ≤ −wU ′(w), then
y∗(w) =

yM∗(w) for w ∈ [w,wη] if wη ≤ wα,
yM∗(w) for w ∈ (wη, wα),
yM∗(wα) for w ∈ [wα, wβ] if wα > w,
yR∗(wβ) for w ∈ [wα, wβ] if wβ < w,
yR∗(w) for w ∈ (wβ, w),
yR∗(w) for w = w,
(B.64)
for some wη, wα, wβ ∈ (w,w) with wα < wβ and k ∈ [wα, wβ].
Proof. We shall complete the proof in 5 steps.
Step 1. By Proposition 3.4.3 (ii), there always exists a downward discontinuity at w = k,
which hence requires the surgery of ironing in the current complete solution. By Proposition 3.4.3
(i) and (iii), there would be two additional downward discontinuities at, respectively, w = w and
w = w whenever −wU ′(w) < U(w) < 0 holds. This case corresponds to part (i) of Theorem
B.2.1. Similarly, based on Proposition 3.4.3, part (ii) of Theorem B.2.1 considers the case with
two discontinuities at w = k and w = w, and part (iii) of Theorem B.2.1 considers the case with
two discontinuities at w = k and w = w. Importantly, it follows from Proposition 3.4.3 that at
least one of these two endpoints w = w and w = w exhibits a downward discontinuity in the
schedule derived under the first-order approach. Due to the similarity between these cases, here
we just prove part (i) of Theorem B.2.1 to economize on the space.
Step 2. Let’s fix the bridge endpoints wη, wα, wβ and wγ , and let y∗(w,wη), y∗(wα, wβ) and
y∗(wγ, w) denote the optimal incomes on these bridges over income intervals [w,wη], [wα, wβ] and
[wγ, w], respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that the bridge over [wα, wβ] cannot
begin in the interior of a bunching interval of the maximax schedule yM∗(·), nor can it end in the
interior of a bunching interval of maximin schedule yR∗(·).
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Step 3. In what follows, let BM and BR denote the types that are bunched with some other types
in the complete solution to the maximax and maximin problems, respectively. Also, whenever w
is bunched, we let interval [w−, w+] denote the set of types bunched with w.
We now equivalently rewrite the maximand of problem (B.1) as follows
U(k) =
∫ k
w
{[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w)
Γ(w,w)
+
y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)[
1− Γ(w,w)
Γ(w,w)
]}
dw
+
∫ w
k
{[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w)
Γ(w,w)
− y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
Γ(w,w)
Γ(w,w)
}
dw.
(B.65)
Taking into account the bunching possibility, (B.65) should be modified as follows:
U∗(k) =
∫ k
w
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{w|w/∈BM}dw
+
∫ k
w
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(w−, w+),Γ(w−, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{w|w∈BM}dw
+
∫ w
k
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{w|w/∈BR}dw
+
∫ w
k
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(w−, w+),Γ(w+, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{w|w∈BR}dw,
(B.66)
in which
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
≡
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w)
Γ(w,w)
+
y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)[
1− Γ(w,w)
Γ(w,w)
]
;
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(w−, w+),Γ(w−, w),Γ(w,w))
≡
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ(w−, w+)
Γ(w,w)
+
y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)[
1− Γ(w−, w)
Γ(w,w)
]
(B.67)
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and
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
≡
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w)
Γ(w,w)
− y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
Γ(w,w)
Γ(w,w)
;
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(w−, w+),Γ(w+, w),Γ(w,w))
≡
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ(w−, w+)
Γ(w,w)
− y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
Γ(w+, w)
Γ(w,w)
(B.68)
with I being a standard indicator function.
As ironing does not affect the solution outside a bunching region, no modifications to the
integrands in (B.66) are needed for types that are not bunched. Departing from the first-order
approach, if an extra unit of consumption is given to type-w workers, it must be given to all workers
who are bunched with them, whose mass is Γ(w−, w+). Also, if w is bunched, in the maximax
case, some of this extra consumption can be reclaimed from workers of lower types than those
bunched with w, whose mass is Γ(w,w)− Γ(w−, w). The corresponding workers in the maximin
case are those workers of higher types than those bunched with w, whose mass is Γ(w+, w).
Step 4. Now, the selfishly optimal income schedule of proposer k ∈ (w,w) is obtained by
solving the following problem:
max
y(·)
{∫ wη
w
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(w−, w+),Γ(w−, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wη∈(w,wα)}∩{w−=w}∩{w+=wη}dw
+
∫ wα
wη
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wη≤wα}dw
+
∫ k
wα
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wα, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wα>w}dw
+
∫ wβ
k
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wβ, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wβ<w}dw
+
∫ wγ
wβ
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wγ≥wβ}dw
+
∫ w
wγ
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(w−, w+),Γ(w+, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wγ∈(wβ ,w)}∩{w−=wγ}∩{w+=w}dw
}
,
(B.69)
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subject to
y(w) =

y∗(w,wη) for w ∈ [w,wη],
y∗(wα, wβ) for w ∈ [wα, wβ],
y∗(wγ, w) for w ∈ [wγ, w].
(B.70)
In consequence, for the current purpose, problem (B.69) can be simplified as the following uncon-
strained maximization problem:
max
y(·)
{∫ wα
wη
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wη≤wα}dw
+
∫ wγ
wβ
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wγ≥wβ}dw
}
.
As is obvious, this problem can be solved point-wise, and the solution is given implicitly by the
these first-order conditions:
∂Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
∂y(w)
+
∂Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
∂f˜(w)
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
+
∂Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(w,w)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
= 0 for ∀w ∈ (wη, wα),
(B.71)
and
∂Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
∂y(w)
+
∂Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
∂f˜(w)
∂f˜(w)
∂y(w)
+
∂Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(w,w)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
= 0 for ∀w ∈ (wβ, wγ).
(B.72)
As before, we denote the resulting solutions as yM∗(·) and yR∗(·), respectively.
Step 5. We now show that y∗(wα, wβ) = yM∗(wα) if wα > w and y∗(wα, wβ) = yR∗(wβ) if
wβ < w. Based on the above ironing procedure, we can apply the same reasoning used to prove
103
the Proposition 3 of [14] to show that y∗(·) is continuous on [w,w].
Suppose that there exists a type k′ > k for which y∗(k′) is not the maximin income, formally
y∗(k′) 6= yR∗(k′). The SOIC condition (3.7) must therefore bind at k′, which implies that the slope
of y∗(·) is zero at k′. Since y∗(·) is continuous, we obtain that there exists a wβ > k′ such that
y∗(·) is constant on [k, wβ] and coincides with the maximin income schedule yR∗(·) on [wβ, wγ].
Similarly, if there exists a type k′ < k for which y∗(k′) is not the maximax income, formally
y∗(k′) 6= yM∗(k′), we can use the same argument to show that there exists a wα < k′ such that
y∗(·) is constant on [wα, k] and coincides with the maximax income schedule yM∗(·) on [wη, wα].
By further setting y∗(w,wη) ≡ yM∗(w) and y∗(wγ, w) ≡ yR∗(w) in (B.70), then the desired
income schedule given by (B.62) is established.
Theorem B.2.2. For any proposer of type k ∈ (w,w), the bridge endpoints are chosen as follows.
(i) The optimal values of the bridge endpoints wα and wβ are determined by the first-
order condition (B.75) for wβ < w and by the first-order condition (B.91) for
wα > w.
(ii) The optimal value of the bridge endpoint wη is the solution to equation yM∗(w) =
yM∗(w), or wη = (yM∗)−1(yM∗(w)).
(iii) The optimal value of the bridge endpoint wγ is the solution to equation yR∗(w) =
yR∗(w), or wγ = (yR∗)−1(yR∗(w)).
Proof. We shall complete the proof in 4 steps.
Step 1. We first determine the optimal endpoints wα and wβ of the bridge connecting the maxi-
max income schedule and the maximin income schedule. Our proof employs the procedure devel-
oped by [14].
Suppose wβ < w holds. By continuity of income schedule y∗(·), we get from Theorem B.2.1
that y∗(wβ) = yR∗(wβ). Also, y∗(wβ) = y∗(wα) because income is a constant on the bridge. If we
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also have wα > w, then by continuity again, y∗(wα) = yM∗(wα). Define
ψ(wβ) ≡

(yM∗)−1(yR∗(wβ)) if wα > w,
wα if wα = w.
(B.73)
So we can write the proposer k’s objective function of choosing wβ as follows:
Ξ(wβ; k) ≡
∫ ψ(wβ)
wη
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wη≤wα}∩{y(w)=yM∗(w)}dw
+
∫ k
ψ(wβ)
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ),Γ(ψ(wβ), w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wα>w}∩{y(w)=yR∗(wβ)}dw
+
∫ wβ
k
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ),Γ(wβ, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wβ<w}∩{y(w)=yR∗(wβ)}dw
+
∫ wγ
wβ
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wγ≥wβ}∩{y(w)=yR∗(w)}dw.
(B.74)
Thus, the choice of wβ for any worker of type k is the solution to the maximization problem
max
wβ
Ξ(wβ; k).
Using (B.74), the first-order condition with respect to wβ can be derived as
Ψ1 + Ψ2(k) + Ψ3(k) + Ψ4 = 0, (B.75)
in which
Ψ1 =
dψ(wβ)
dwβ
{
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wη≤wα}∩{y(w)=yM∗(w)}∩{w=ψ(wβ)}
− Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ),Γ(ψ(wβ), w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wα>w}∩{y(w)=yR∗(wβ)}∩{w=ψ(wβ)}
}
,
(B.76)
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Ψ2(k) =∫ k
ψ(wβ)
∂Φ˜M∗(w, yR∗(wβ),Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ),Γ(ψ(wβ), w),Γ(w,w))
∂yR∗(wβ)
dyR∗(wβ)
dwβ
· I{wα>w}dw
+
∫ k
ψ(wβ)
∂Φ˜M∗(w, yR∗(wβ),Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ),Γ(ψ(wβ), w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ)
∂Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ)
∂wβ
· I{wα>w}dw
+
∫ k
ψ(wβ)
∂Φ˜M∗(w, yR∗(wβ),Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ),Γ(ψ(wβ), w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(ψ(wβ), w)
∂Γ(ψ(wβ), w)
∂wβ
· I{wα>w}dw
≡
∫ k
ψ(wβ)
[Ψ21(w) + Ψ22(w) + Ψ23(w)] · I{wα>w}dw,
(B.77)
Ψ3(k) =∫ wβ
k
∂Φ˜R∗(w, yR∗(wβ),Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ),Γ(wβ, w),Γ(w,w))
∂yR∗(wβ)
dyR∗(wβ)
dwβ
· I{wβ<w}dw
+
∫ wβ
k
∂Φ˜R∗(w, yR∗(wβ),Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ),Γ(wβ, w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ)
∂Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ)
∂wβ
· I{wβ<w}dw
+
∫ wβ
k
∂Φ˜R∗(w, yR∗(wβ),Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ),Γ(wβ, w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(wβ, w)
∂Γ(wβ, w)
∂wβ
· I{wβ<w}dw
≡
∫ wβ
k
[Ψ31(w) + Ψ32(w) + Ψ33(w)] · I{wβ<w}dw,
(B.78)
and
Ψ4 = Φ˜
R∗(w, y(w),Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ),Γ(wβ, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wβ<w}∩{y(w)=yR∗(wβ)}∩{w=wβ}
− Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wγ≥wβ}∩{y(w)=yR∗(w)}∩{w=wβ}.
(B.79)
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Step 2. By using (B.67) and (B.68), we can have
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wα, w),Γ(w,w))
≡
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ(wα, wβ)
Γ(w,w)
+
y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)[
1− Γ(wα, w)
Γ(w,w)
]
,
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wβ, w),Γ(w,w))
≡
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ(wα, wβ)
Γ(w,w)
− y(w)
w2
h′
(
y(w)
w
)
Γ(wβ, w)
Γ(w,w)
(B.80)
for ∀w ∈ [wα, wβ].
By using (B.73), (B.80), (B.67) and (B.68), we can rewrite (B.76) as
Ψ1 =
dψ(wβ)
dwβ
{
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wη≤wα}∩{y(w)=yR∗(wβ)}∩{w=ψ(wβ)}
− Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(w,wβ),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wα>w}∩{y(w)=yR∗(wβ)}∩{w=ψ(wβ)}
}
=
dψ(wβ)
dwβ
{
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
− Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(w,wβ),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
}
· I{wη≤wα}∩{wα>w}∩{y(w)=yR∗(wβ)}∩{w=ψ(wβ)}
=
dψ(wβ)
dwβ
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w)− Γ(w,wβ)
Γ(w,w)
· I{wη≤wα}∩{wα>w}∩{y(w)=yR∗(wβ)}∩{w=ψ(wβ)}
=
dψ(wβ)
dwβ
[
yR∗(wβ)− h
(
yR∗(wβ)
ψ(wβ)
)]
f˜(ψ(wβ))− Γ(ψ(wβ), wβ)
Γ(w,w)
· I{wη≤wα}∩{wα>w}.
(B.81)
By using (B.77) and (B.80), we have
Ψ21(w) =
{[
1− 1
w
h′
(
yR∗(wβ)
w
)]
Γ(ψ (wβ) , wβ)
Γ(w,w)
+
[
1
w2
h′
(
yR∗(wβ)
w
)
+
yR∗(wβ)
w3
h′′
(
yR∗(wβ)
w
)][
1− Γ(ψ (wβ) , w)
Γ(w,w)
]}
dyR∗(wβ)
dwβ
,
(B.82)
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Ψ22(w) =
[
yR∗(wβ)− h
(
yR∗(wβ)
w
)]
1
Γ(w,w)
×
{
f˜(wβ)− f˜ (ψ(wβ)) dψ(wβ)
dwβ
+
[∫ wβ
ψ(wβ)
∂f˜(w)
∂yR∗(wβ)
dyR∗(wβ)
dwβ
dw
]}
,
(B.83)
and
Ψ23(w) =
yR∗(wβ)
w2
h′
(
yR∗(wβ)
w
)
f˜ (ψ(wβ))
Γ(w,w)
dψ(wβ)
dwβ
. (B.84)
Similarly, By using (B.78) and (B.80), we have
Ψ31(w) =
{[
1− 1
w
h′
(
yR∗(wβ)
w
)]
Γ(ψ (wβ) , wβ)
Γ(w,w)
−
[
1
w2
h′
(
yR∗(wβ)
w
)
+
yR∗(wβ)
w3
h′′
(
yR∗(wβ)
w
)]
Γ(wβ, w)
Γ(w,w)
}
dyR∗(wβ)
dwβ
,
(B.85)
Ψ32(w) =
[
yR∗(wβ)− h
(
yR∗(wβ)
w
)]
1
Γ(w,w)
×
{
f˜(wβ)− f˜ (ψ(wβ)) dψ(wβ)
dwβ
+
[∫ wβ
ψ(wβ)
∂f˜(w)
∂yR∗(wβ)
dyR∗(wβ)
dwβ
dw
]}
,
(B.86)
and
Ψ33(w) =
yR∗(wβ)
w2
h′
(
yR∗(wβ)
w
)
f˜ (wβ)
Γ(w,w)
. (B.87)
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Finally, by using (B.80), we can rewrite (B.79) as
Ψ4 = Φ˜
R∗(w, y(w),Γ(ψ(w), w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wβ<w}∩{y(w)=yR∗(wβ)}∩{w=wβ}
− Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wγ≥wβ}∩{y(w)=yR∗(w)}∩{w=wβ}
=
[
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(ψ(w), w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))− Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
]
× I{wγ≥wβ}∩{wβ<w}∩{y(w)=yR∗(w)}∩{w=wβ}
=
{[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ (ψ(w), w)− f˜(w)
Γ (w,w)
}
I{wγ≥wβ}∩{wβ<w}∩{y(w)=yR∗(w)}∩{w=wβ}.
(B.88)
Step 3. Suppose wα > w holds. By continuity of income schedule y∗(·), we get from Theorem
B.2.1 that y∗(wα) = yM∗(wα). Also, y∗(wβ) = y∗(wα) because income is a constant on the bridge.
If we also have wβ < w, then by continuity again, y∗(wβ) = yR∗(wβ). Define
ϕ(wα) ≡

(yR∗)−1(yM∗(wα)) if wβ < w,
wβ if wβ = w.
(B.89)
So we can write the proposer k’s objective function of choosing wα as follows:
Ξ(wα; k) ≡
∫ wα
wη
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wη≤wα}∩{y(w)=yM∗(w)}dw
+
∫ k
wα
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, ϕ(wα)),Γ(wα, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wα>w}∩{y(w)=yM∗(wα)}dw
+
∫ ϕ(wα)
k
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, ϕ(wα)),Γ(ϕ(wα), w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wβ<w}∩{y(w)=yM∗(wα)}dw
+
∫ wγ
ϕ(wα)
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wγ≥wβ}∩{y(w)=yR∗(w)}dw.
(B.90)
Thus, the choice of wα for any worker of type k is the solution to the maximization problem
max
wα
Ξ(wα; k).
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Using (B.90), the first-order condition with respect to wα can be derived as
Λ1 + Λ2(k) + Λ3(k) + Λ4 = 0, (B.91)
in which
Λ1 =
[
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))− Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(w,ϕ(w)),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
]
× I{wη≤wα}∩{wα>w}∩{y(w)=yM∗(w)}∩{w=wα}
=
{[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
f˜(w)− Γ(w,ϕ(w))
Γ (w,w)
}
I{wη≤wα}∩{wα>w}∩{y(w)=yM∗(w)}∩{w=wα},
(B.92)
Λ2(k) =
∫ k
wα
[Λ21(w) + Λ22(w) + Λ23(w)] · I{wα>w}dw, (B.93)
with
Λ21(w) =
{[
1− 1
w
h′
(
yM∗(wα)
w
)]
Γ(wα, ϕ(wα))
Γ(w,w)
+
[
1
w2
h′
(
yM∗(wα)
w
)
+
yM∗(wα)
w3
h′′
(
yM∗(wα)
w
)][
1− Γ(wα, w)
Γ(w,w)
]}
dyM∗(wα)
dwα
,
(B.94)
Λ22(w) =
[
yM∗(wα)− h
(
yM∗(wα)
w
)]
1
Γ(w,w)
×
{
f˜ (ϕ(wα))
dϕ(wα)
dwα
− f˜(wα) +
[∫ ϕ(wα)
wα
∂f˜(w)
∂yM∗(wα)
dyM∗(wα)
dwα
dw
]}
,
(B.95)
and
Λ23(w) =
yM∗(wα)
w2
h′
(
yM∗(wα)
w
)
f˜ (wα)
Γ(w,w)
; (B.96)
Λ3(k) =
∫ ϕ(wα)
k
[Λ31(w) + Λ32(w) + Λ33(w)] · I{wβ<w}dw, (B.97)
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with
Λ31(w) =
{[
1− 1
w
h′
(
yM∗(wα)
w
)]
Γ(wα, ϕ(wα))
Γ(w,w)
−
[
1
w2
h′
(
yM∗(wα)
w
)
+
yM∗(wα)
w3
h′′
(
yM∗(wα)
w
)]
Γ(ϕ(wα), w)
Γ(w,w)
}
dyM∗(wα)
dwα
,
(B.98)
Λ32(w) =
[
yM∗(wα)− h
(
yM∗(wα)
w
)]
1
Γ(w,w)
×
{
f˜ (ϕ(wα))
dϕ(wα)
dwα
− f˜(wα) +
[∫ ϕ(wα)
wα
∂f˜(w)
∂yM∗(wα)
dyM∗(wα)
dwα
dw
]}
,
(B.99)
and
Λ33(w) =
yM∗(wα)
w2
h′
(
yM∗(wα)
w
)
f˜ (ϕ(wα))
Γ(w,w)
dϕ(wα)
dwα
; (B.100)
and finally
Λ4 =
dϕ(wα)
dwα
×
[Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wβ<w}∩{y(w)=yM∗(wα)}∩{w=ϕ(wα)}
− Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wγ≥wβ}∩{y(w)=yM∗(wα)}∩{w=ϕ(wα)}]
=
[
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))− Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w))
]
× I{wγ≥wβ}∩{wβ<w}∩{y(w)=yM∗(wα)}∩{w=ϕ(wα)}
dϕ(wα)
dwα
=
{[
yM∗(wα)− h
(
yM∗(wα)
ϕ(wα)
)]
Γ (wα, ϕ(wα))− f˜(ϕ(wα))
Γ (w,w)
}
dϕ(wα)
dwα
I{wγ≥wβ}∩{wβ<w}.
(B.101)
Step 4. By using (B.69), we can establish the first-order conditions implicitly solving for y(w)
and y(w), and we denote the solutions as yM∗(w) and yR∗(w), respectively. Since for each of these
two bridges, one of the endpoints is already fixed, the other endpoint is actually fixed given the
established optimal income schedule. That is, wη is determined by setting yM∗(wη) = yM∗(w) and
wγ is determined by setting yR∗(wγ) = yR∗(w).
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Proposition B.2.1. If the following condition

dwα
dwβ
≥ f˜(wβ)
f˜(wα)
for wβ < w,
f˜(wα)
f˜(wβ)
≥ dwβ
dwα
for wα > w
(B.102)
holds, then the bridge endpoints wα(k) and wβ(k) are nondecreasing in k for ∀k ∈ [w,w].
Proof. We shall complete the proof in 2 steps.
Step 1. We first consider the case with wβ < w. It follows from (B.74) and (B.75) that
∂2Ξ(wβ; k)
∂wβ∂k
=
dΨ2(k)
dk
+
dΨ3(k)
dk
. (B.103)
By using equations (B.82)-(B.87), (B.103) can be explicitly expressed as
dΨ2(k)
dk
+
dΨ3(k)
dk
= [Ψ21(k) + Ψ22(k) + Ψ23(k)]− [Ψ31(k) + Ψ32(k) + Ψ33(k)]
= [Ψ21(k)−Ψ31(k)] + [Ψ22(k)−Ψ32(k)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ [Ψ23(k)−Ψ33(k)]
=
[
1
k2
h′
(
yR∗(wβ)
k
)
+
yR∗(wβ)
k3
h′′
(
yR∗(wβ)
k
)][
1− Γ(ψ (wβ) , w)
Γ(w,w)
+
Γ(wβ, w)
Γ(w,w)
]
dyR∗(wβ)
dwβ
+
yR∗(wβ)
k2
h′
(
yR∗(wβ)
k
)
1
Γ(w,w)
[
f˜(ψ(wβ))
dψ(wβ)
dwβ
− f˜(wβ)
]
.
(B.104)
Since dyR∗(wβ)/dwβ > 0 by assumption, we have
[
1
k2
h′
(
yR∗(wβ)
k
)
+
yR∗(wβ)
k3
h′′
(
yR∗(wβ)
k
)][
1− Γ(ψ (wβ) , w)
Γ(w,w)
+
Γ(wβ, w)
Γ(w,w)
]
dyR∗(wβ)
dwβ
> 0.
As such
∂2Ξ(wβ; k)
∂wβ∂k
=
dΨ2(k)
dk
+
dΨ3(k)
dk
> 0 (B.105)
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whenever
f˜(ψ(wβ))
dψ(wβ)
dwβ
≥ f˜(wβ),
as desired. In particular, dψ(wβ)/dwβ > 0 based on the construction of ψ(·) given in the proof of
Theorem B.2.2 as well as the monotonicity of the income schedule. In the case of (B.105), Ξ(wβ; k)
is a supermodular function, and an application of Topkis Theorem (see Topkis [67], Theorem 6.1)
implies that wβ(k) is nondecreasing in k.
Step 2. We now consider the case with wα > w. It follows from (B.90) and (B.91) that
∂2Ξ(wα; k)
∂wα∂k
=
dΛ2(k)
dk
+
dΛ3(k)
dk
. (B.106)
By using equations (B.93)-(B.100), (B.106) can be explicitly expressed as
dΛ2(k)
dk
+
dΛ3(k)
dk
= [Λ21(k) + Λ22(k) + Λ23(k)]− [Λ31(k) + Λ32(k) + Λ33(k)]
= [Λ21(k)− Λ31(k)] + [Λ22(k)− Λ32(k)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ [Λ23(k)− Λ33(k)]
=
[
1
k2
h′
(
yM∗(wα)
k
)
+
yM∗(wα)
k3
h′′
(
yM∗(wα)
k
)][
1− Γ(wα, w)
Γ(w,w)
+
Γ(ϕ(wα), w)
Γ(w,w)
]
dyM∗(wα)
dwα
+
yM∗(wα)
k2
h′
(
yM∗(wα)
k
)
1
Γ(w,w)
[
f˜(wα)− f˜(ϕ(wα))dϕ(wα)
dwα
]
.
(B.107)
Since dyM∗(wα)/dwα > 0 by assumption, we have by (B.107) that
∂2Ξ(wα; k)
∂wα∂k
=
dΛ2(k)
dk
+
dΛ3(k)
dk
> 0 (B.108)
whenever
f˜(wα) ≥ f˜(ϕ(wα))dϕ(wα)
dwα
,
as desired in (B.102). In the case of (B.108), Ξ(wα; k) is a supermodular function, and an applica-
tion of Topkis Theorem (see [67]) implies that wα(k) is nondecreasing in k.
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Proposition B.2.2. The bridge endpoint wη(k) is decreasing whereas the bridge endpoint wγ(k)
is increasing in the type k of the proposer.
Proof. We shall complete the proofs in 3 steps.
Step 1. By using (B.67), we have
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(w−, w+),Γ(w−, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wη∈(w,wα)}∩{w−=w}∩{w+=wη}
=
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ(w,wη)
Γ(w,w)
· I{wη∈(w,wα)}.
(B.109)
By using (B.68), we have
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(w−, w+),Γ(w+, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wγ∈(wβ ,w)}∩{w−=wγ}∩{w+=w}
=
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ(wγ, w)
Γ(w,w)
· I{wγ∈(wβ ,w)}.
(B.110)
Substituting (B.109) and (B.110) into (B.69) results in
U∗(k) =
∫ wη
w
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ(w,wη)
Γ(w,w)
· I{wη∈(w,wα)}dw
+
∫ wα
wη
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wη≤wα}dw
+
∫ k
wα
Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wα, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wα>w}dw
+
∫ wβ
k
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wβ, w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wβ<w}dw
+
∫ wγ
wβ
Φ˜R∗(w, y(w), f˜(w),Γ(w,w),Γ(w,w)) · I{wγ≥wβ}dw
+
∫ w
wγ
[
y(w)− h
(
y(w)
w
)]
Γ(wγ, w)
Γ(w,w)
· I{wγ∈(wβ ,w)}dw.
(B.111)
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Step 2. With respect to y(w), we get from (B.111) and (B.80) that
∂2U∗(k)
∂y(w)∂k
=
∂Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wα, w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(w,w)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
· I{wα>w}∩{w=k}
− ∂Φ˜
R∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wβ, w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(w,w)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
· I{wβ<w}∩{w=k}
=
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· y(k)
k2
h′
(
y(k)
k
)
1
Γ(w,w)2
· [Γ(wα, w)− Γ(wβ, w)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· I{wα>w}∩{wβ<w}
< 0.
(B.112)
Hence, (B.112) implies that U∗(k) is a submodular function, and an application of Topkis Theorem
(see [67]) implies that y(w) is decreasing in k. Since the other endpoint wη(k) is completely
determined by the value of y(w), we get that wη(k) is decreasing in k.
Step 3. With respect to y(w), we get from (B.111) and (B.80) that
∂2U∗(k)
∂y(w)∂k
=
∂Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wα, w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(wα, w)
∂Γ(wα, w)
∂y(w)
· I{wα>w}∩{w=k}
+
∂Φ˜M∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wα, w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(w,w)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
· I{wα>w}∩{w=k}
− ∂Φ˜
R∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wβ, w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(wβ, w)
∂Γ(wβ, w)
∂y(w)
· I{wβ<w}∩{w=k}
− ∂Φ˜
R∗(w, y(w),Γ(wα, wβ),Γ(wβ, w),Γ(w,w))
∂Γ(w,w)
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)
· I{wβ<w}∩{w=k}
=
∂Γ(w,w)
∂y(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· y(k)
k2
h′
(
y(k)
k
)
1
Γ(w,w)2
· [Γ(wα, w)− Γ(wβ, w)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· I{wα>w}∩{wβ<w}
> 0.
(B.113)
Hence, (B.113) implies that U∗(k) is a supermodular function, and an application of Topkis Theo-
rem (see [67]) implies that y(w) is increasing in k. Since the other endpoint wγ(k) is completely
determined by the value of y(w), we accordingly have that wγ(k) is increasing in k.
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Theorem B.2.3. If the following condition

dwα
dwβ
≥ f˜(wβ)
f˜(wα)
for wβ < w,
f˜(wα)
f˜(wβ)
≥ dwβ
dwα
for wα > w
holds, then the selfishly optimal income tax schedule over (w,w] for the median skill type is a
Condorcet winner under pairwise majority voting.
Proof. Given Propositions B.2.1 and B.2.2, the proof is the same as that of Theorem 3.5.1.
We, therefore, have established the voting equilibrium under the complete solution of the tax
design problem.
B.3 The Relation between Ex Ante and Ex Post Median Skill Levels
After combining the migration decisions, the ex post measure of workers is given by
Γ(w,w) =
∫ w
w
f˜(w)dw =
∫ wm
w
f˜(w)dw +
∫ w
wm
f˜(w)dw. (B.114)
By using (3.8), we get the right-hand terms of (B.114) as
∫ wm
w
f˜(w)dw =
1
2
+ LI([w,wm])− LO([w,wm])︸ ︷︷ ︸
LNI([w,wm]) = net labor inflow
(B.115)
and ∫ w
wm
f˜(w)dw =
1
2
+ LI([wm, w])− LO([wm, w])︸ ︷︷ ︸
LNI([wm,w]) = net labor inflow
, (B.116)
in which the measures of labor inflows are defined as
LI([w,wm]) ≡
∫
{w∈[w,wm]|∆(w)≥0}
G−(∆(w)|w)f−(w)n−dw,
LI([wm, w]) ≡
∫
{w∈[wm,w]|∆(w)≥0}
G−(∆(w)|w)f−(w)n−dw,
(B.117)
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and the measures of labor outflows are defined as
LO([w,wm]) ≡
∫
{w∈[w,wm]|∆(w)≤0}
G(−∆(w)|w)f(w)dw,
LO([wm, w]) ≡
∫
{w∈[wm,w]|∆(w)≤0}
G(−∆(w)|w)f(w)dw.
(B.118)
By using (B.114)-(B.118), we can identify the relation of the ex post median skill level w˜m
with the ex ante median skill level wm and summarize the results as three propositions.
Proposition B.3.1. Suppose Γ(w,w) = 1. We have: (a) If LNI([w,wm]) = LNI([wm, w]) =
0, then w˜m = wm; (b) If LNI([w,wm]) > 0 and LNI([wm, w]) < 0, then w˜m < wm; (c) If
LNI([w,wm]) < 0 and LNI([wm, w]) > 0, then w˜m > wm.
Proposition B.3.2. Suppose Γ(w,w) > 1. We have: (a) If LNI([w,wm]) = 0 and LNI([wm, w]) >
0, then w˜m > wm; (b) If LNI([w,wm]) > 0 and LNI([wm, w]) = 0, then w˜m < wm; (c) If
LNI([w,wm]) > 0 and LNI([wm, w]) > 0, then w˜m < wm for LNI([w,wm]) > LNI([wm, w]),
w˜m = wm for LNI([w,wm]) = LNI([wm, w]), and w˜m > wm for LNI([w,wm]) < LNI([wm, w]);
(d) If LNI([w,wm]) > 0 and LNI([wm, w]) < 0, then w˜m < wm; (e) If LNI([w,wm]) < 0 and
LNI([wm, w]) > 0, then w˜m > wm.
Proposition B.3.3. Suppose Γ(w,w) < 1. We have: (a) If LNI([w,wm]) = 0 and LNI([wm, w]) <
0, then w˜m < wm; (b) If LNI([w,wm]) < 0 and LNI([wm, w]) = 0, then w˜m > wm; (c) If
LNI([w,wm]) < 0 and LNI([wm, w]) < 0, then w˜m < wm for LNI([w,wm]) > LNI([wm, w]),
w˜m = wm for LNI([w,wm]) = LNI([wm, w]), and w˜m > wm for LNI([w,wm]) < LNI([wm, w]);
(d) If LNI([w,wm]) > 0 and LNI([wm, w]) < 0, then w˜m < wm; (e) If LNI([w,wm]) < 0 and
LNI([wm, w]) > 0, then w˜m > wm.
To identity the relation between ex ante and ex post median skill levels, we divide the ex post
population of workers into two groups: the first group of workers with skill levels lower than the
ex ante median skill level and the second group of workers with skill levels higher than the ex ante
median skill level. Propositions B.3.1-B.3.3 consider three possible cases corresponding to three
possible ex post measures of workers of all skill levels.
117
Proposition B.3.1 considers the case that migrations do not change the total measure of workers.
Then we have three possible subcases. Subcase (a) shows that labor inflow and labor outflow cancel
each other for both groups, and hence the median skill level should be the same under the same total
measure. Subcase (b) shows that the first group faces positive net labor inflow while the second
group faces positive net labor outflow, hence the position of ex post median skill level should move
towards the left direction under the same total measure, leading to a smaller median skill level than
the ex ante one. Subcase (c) shows that the first group faces positive net labor outflow while the
second group faces positive net labor inflow, hence the position of ex post median skill level should
move towards the right direction under the same total measure, leading to a larger median skill level
than the ex ante one. We can analyze Propositions B.3.2-B.3.3 in the similar way.
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